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Abstract
In this work, we systematically investigate mean field games and mean field type control
problems with multiple populations using a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic
differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type stemming from Pontryagin’s stochastic maximum
principle. Although the same cost functions as well as the coefficient functions of the state
dynamics are shared among the agents within each population, they can be different population
by population. We study the mean field limit for the three different situations; (i) every agent is
non-cooperative; (ii) the agents within each population are cooperative; and (iii) the agents in
some populations are cooperative but those in the other populations are not. We provide several
sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium for each of these cases.
Furthermore, under appropriate conditions, we show that the mean field solution to each of
these problems actually provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game
with a large but finite number of agents.
Keywords : mean field game, mean field type control, FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type
1 Introduction
In pioneering works of Lasry & Lions [26, 27, 28] and Huang, Malhame & Caines [22], the two
groups of researchers independently proposed a powerful technique to produce an approximate
Nash equilibrium for stochastic differential games among a large number of agents with symmetric
interactions. Importantly, each agent is assumed to be affected by the states of the other agents
only through their empirical distribution. In the large population limit, the problem is shown
to result in two highly coupled nonlinear partial differential equations (PDEs), the one is of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman type, which takes care of the optimization problem, while the other is of
the Kolmogorov type guaranteeing the consistent time evolution of the distribution of the individual
states of the agents. The greatest benefit of the mean-field game approach is to render notoriously
intractable problems of stochastic differential games among many agents into simpler stochastic
optimal control problems. For details of the analytical approach and its various applications, one
may consult the monographs by Bensoussan, Frehse & Yam [2], Gomes, Nurbekyan & Pimentel [20],
Gomes, Pimentel & Voskanyan [21] and also Kolokoltsov & Malafeyev [24].
∗All the contents expressed in this research are solely those of the author and do not represent any views or
opinions of any institutions. The author is not responsible or liable in any manner for any losses and/or damages
caused by the use of any contents in this research.
†Quantitative Finance Course, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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In a series of works [7, 8, 9], Carmona & Delarue developed a probabilistic approach to these
problems, where forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of McKean-Vlasov
type instead of PDEs were shown to be the relevant objects for investigation. In particular, they
provided the sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for mean field games with
the cost functions of quadratic growth in [8]. In the case of cooperative agents who adopt the
common feedback control function, they showed in [9] that the large population limit results in
the optimization problem with respect to a controlled McKean-Vlasov SDE. Using the notion of
so-called L-derivative, which is a type of differential for functions defined on the space of proba-
bility measures, they solved the problem by a new class of FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov type. A
probabilistic but weak formulation of the mean-field games was studied in Carmona & Lacker [12]
and, in particular, in Carmona, Delarue & Lacker [13] in the presence of common noise. The details
of probabilistic approaches, concrete examples, and many references for various applications are
available in the recent two volumes of monograph [10, 11].
In this work, we are interested in mean field games and mean field type control problems
in the presence of multiple populations. Here, the same cost functions as well as the coefficient
functions of the state dynamics are shared among the agents within each population, but they can
be different population by population. Mean field games with multiple populations arise naturally
in most of the practical applications, and were already considered in the first original work of [22].
Lachapelle & Wolfram [25] modeled a congestion problem of pedestrian crowds, and Achdou, Bardi
& Cirant [1] studied the issue of urban settlements and residential choice using the mean-field
game representation. Feleqi [17] and Cirant [14] dealt with ergodic mean field games of multiple
populations under different boundary conditions. Recently, Bensoussan, Huang & Lauriere have
considered a new type of problem in [3], where the agents within each population are cooperative
but compete with those in the other populations. They gave necessary conditions for equilibrium
in terms of master equations. Note that, in all of these existing works, the analytic approach based
on coupled nonlinear PDEs has been adopted.
In the current paper, differently from the existing works, we have adopted the probabilistic
approach and closely followed the procedures developed in [8, 9]. In addition to the mean field
games of multiple populations, we have studied the situation where the agents in each population
are cooperative as in [3], and yet another situation which is a mixture of the first two cases: the
agents in some populations are cooperative within their own but those in the other populations are
not. The presence of multiple populations induces a system of FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov type.
Although it is a coupled system of FBSDEs due to the interactions among different populations,
the couplings appear only through the mean field interactions i.e., the distribution of the state of
the representative agent of each population. This feature allows us to solve a matching problem
corresponding to the state of equilibrium by Schauder’s fixed point theorem in a quite similar
manner to [8]. In each of the three cases mentioned above, we have found several sets of sufficient
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, in particular the one which allows the cost functions
of quadratic growth both in the state variable as well as in its distribution so that it is applicable
to some of the popular linear quadratic problems. Moreover, we have investigated the quantitative
relationships between the mean field problems discussed above and those with finite agents. In
particular, under additional assumptions, we have proved that each mean field solution actually
provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game with a large but finite
number of agents. It highlights some interesting differences between the game where all the agents
are non-cooperative and the one where the agents are cooperative in some populations.
The organization of the paper is as follows: after explaining notations in Section 2, we study
the mean field problems in the first half of the paper; in Section 3 (i) the case of non-cooperative
agents, in Section 4 (ii) the case where the agents are cooperative within each population, and in
Section 5 (iii) the agents in some populations are cooperative but those in the other populations are
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not. In the second half of the paper, we investigate the corresponding problem with finite number
of agents; we treats in Section 6 the case (i), in Section 7 the case (ii), and finally in Section 8 we
treats the case (iii). Although we set the number of populations to two in the main analysis, this
is just for notational convenience. We shall see that the analysis can be easily generalized to any
finite number of populations. Finally, we conclude in Section 9.
2 Notations
Throughout the paper, we work on some complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a
right-continuous and complete filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] supporting two independent d-dimensional
standard Brownian motions
(
W 1 = (W 1t )t∈[0,T ],W
2 = (W 2t )t∈[0,T ]
)
as well as two independent
random variables ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d). For each i ∈ {1, 2}, Fi := (F it )t∈[0,T ] ⊂ F is a complete
and right-continuous filtration generated by (ξi,W i). Here, T > 0 is a given terminal time. To
lighten the notation, unless otherwise stated, we use indices i and j specifically to represent an
element in {1, 2}, and we always suppose that j 6= i when they appear in the same expression.
Moreover, we use the symbol C to represent a general nonnegative constant which may change line
by line. When we want to emphasize that C depends only on some specific variables, say a and
b, we use the symbol C(a, b). We let || · ||2 denote the L
2(Ω,F ,P;Rd)-norm. We use the following
notations for frequently encountered spaces:
• S2 is the set of Rd-valued continuous processes X satisfying
||X||S2 := E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|
2
] 1
2 <∞ .
• S∞ is the set of Rd-valued essentially bounded continuous processes X satisfying
||X||S∞ :=
∣∣∣∣ sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|
∣∣∣∣
∞ <∞ .
• H2 is the set of Rd×d-valued progressively measurable processes Z satisfying
||Z||H2 := E
[(∫ T
0
|Zt|
2dt
)] 1
2
<∞ .
• L(X) denotes the law of a random variable X.
• M1f (R
d) is the set of finite signed measures µ on (Rd,B(Rd)) such that
∫
Rd
|x|d|µ|(x) <∞.
• P(Rd) is the set of probability measures on (Rd,B(Rd)).
• Pp(R
d) with p ≥ 1 is the subset of P(Rd) with finite p-th moment; i.e., the set of µ ∈ P(Rd)
satisfying
Mp(µ) :=
(∫
Rd
|x|pµ(dx)
) 1
p
<∞ .
We always assign Pp(R
d) with (p ≥ 1) the p-Wasserstein distance Wp, which makes the space
Pp(R
d) a complete separable metric space. As an important property, for any µ, ν ∈ Pp(R
d), we
have
Wp(µ, ν) = inf
{
E[|X − Y |p]
1
p ;L(X) = µ,L(Y ) = ν
}
.
For more details, see Chapter 5 in [10] or Chapter 3 in [5].
3
3 Mean Field Games with Multiple Populations
In this section, we consider a mean-field limit of a game among a large number of non-cooperative
agents in the presence of two populations. Here, each agent competes with all the other agents but
shares the common cost functions as well as coefficient functions of the state dynamics within each
population. As we shall see, extending to the general situation with finite number of populations
is straightforward.
3.1 Definition of the Mean Field Problem
Before specifying detailed assumptions, let us formulate the problem of finding an equilibrium in
the limiting framework. It proceeds in the following three steps.
(i) Fix any two deterministic flows of probability measures (µi = (µit)t∈[0,T ])i∈{1,2} given on Rd.
(ii) Solve the two optimal control problems
inf
α1∈A1
J
µ1,µ2
1 (α
1), inf
α2∈A2
J
µ2,µ1
2 (α
2) (3.1)
over some admissible strategies Ai (i ∈ {1, 2}), where
J
µ1,µ2
1 (α
1) := E
[∫ T
0
f1(t,X
1
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t , α
1
t )dt+ g1(X
1
T , µ
1
T , µ
2
T )
]
,
J
µ2,µ1
2 (α
2) := E
[∫ T
0
f2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , α
2
t )dt+ g2(X
2
T , µ
2
T , µ
1
T )
]
,
subject to the d-dimensional diffusion dynamics:
dX1t = b1(t,X
1
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t , α
1
t )dt+ σ1(t,X
1
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t )dW
1
t ,
dX2t = b2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , α
2
t )dt+ σ2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t )dW
2
t ,
for t ∈ [0, T ] with
(
Xi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d)
)
1≤i≤2. For each population i ∈ {1, 2}, we suppose
that Ai is the set of Ai-valued F
i-progressively measurable processes αi satisfying E
∫ T
0 |α
i
t|
2dt <∞
where Ai ⊂ R
k is closed and convex.
(iii) Find a pair of probability flows (µ1,µ2) as a solution to the matching problem:
∀t ∈ [0, T ], µ1t = L(Xˆ
1,µ1,µ2
t ), µ
2
t = L(Xˆ
2,µ2,µ1
t ) , (3.2)
where (Xˆi,µ
i,µj )i∈{1,2},j 6=i are the solutions to the optimal control problems in (ii).
Remark 3.1. It is just for convenience to use the common dimension d (as well as k for Ai) for
both populations.
3.2 Optimization for given flows of probability measures
The main assumptions in this section are as follows:
Assumption 3.1. (MFG-a) L,K ≥ 0 and λ > 0 are some constants. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, the
measurable functions bi : [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)2 × Ai → R
d, σi : [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)2 → Rd×d,
fi : [0, T ]× R
d × P2(R
d)2 ×Ai → R, and gi : R
d × P2(R
d)2 → R satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) The functions bi and σi are affine in (x, α) in the sense that, for any (t, x, µ, ν, α) ∈ [0, T ]×
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R
d ×P2(R
d)2 ×Ai,
bi(t, x, µ, ν, α) := bi,0(t, µ, ν) + bi,1(t, µ, ν)x+ bi,2(t, µ, ν)α ,
σi(t, x, µ, ν) := σi,0(t, µ, ν) + σi,1(t, µ, ν)x ,
where bi,0, bi,1, bi,2, σi,0 and σi,1 defined on [0, T ] × P2(R
d)2 are Rd, Rd×d,Rd×k,Rd×d and Rd×d×d-
valued measurable functions, respectively.
(A2) For any t ∈ [0, T ], the functions P2(R
d)2 ∋ (µ, ν) 7→ (bi,0, bi,1, bi,2, σi,0, σi,1)(t, µ, ν) are
continuous in W2-distance. Moreover for any (t, µ, ν) ∈ [0, T ] × P2(R
d)2,
|bi,0(t, µ, ν)|, |σi,0(t, µ, ν)| ≤ K + L
(
M2(µ) +M2(ν)
)
,
|bi,1(t, µ, ν)|, |bi,2(t, µ, ν)|, |σi,1(t, µ, ν)| ≤ L .
(A3) The function Rd ×Ai ∋ (x, α) 7→ fi(t, x, µ, ν, α) ∈ R is once continuously differentiable with
L-Lipschitz derivatives, i.e. for any t ∈ [0, T ], µ, ν ∈ P2(R
d), x, x′ ∈ Rd, α,α′ ∈ Ai,
|∂(x,α)fi(t, x
′, µ, ν, α′)− ∂(x,α)fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)| ≤ L
(
|x′ − x|+ |α′ − α|
)
,
where ∂(x,α)fi denotes the gradient in the joint variables (x, α). fi also satisfies the λ-convexity:
fi(t, x
′, µ, ν, α′)− fi(t, x, µ, ν, α) − 〈(x′ − x, α′ − α), ∂(x,α)fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)〉 ≥ λ|α′ − α|2 .
(A4) For any (t, x, µ, ν, α) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × P2(R
d)2 ×Ai,
|∂(x,α)fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)| ≤ K + L
(
|x|+ |α|+M2(µ) +M2(ν)
)
.
|fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)| ≤ K + L
(
|x|2 + |α|2 +M2(µ)
2 +M2(ν)
2
)
.
Moreover, for any (t, x, α) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×Ai, the functions P2(R
d)2 ∋ (µ, ν) 7→ fi(t, x, µ, ν, α) and
P2(R
d)2 ∋ (µ, ν) 7→ ∂(x,α)fi(t, x, µ, ν, α) are continuous in W2-distance.
(A5) For any µ, ν ∈ P2(R
d), the function Rd ∋ x 7→ gi(x, µ, ν) ∈ R is convex. It is also once
continuously differentiable with L-Lipschitz derivatives, i.e. ∀x, x′ ∈ Rd, µ, ν ∈ P2(Rd), it holds
|∂xgi(x
′, µ, ν)− ∂xgi(x, µ, ν)| ≤ L|x′ − x| .
For any x ∈ Rd, the functions P2(R
d)2 ∋ (µ, ν) 7→ gi(x, µ, ν) and P2(R
d)2 ∋ (µ, ν) 7→ ∂xgi(x, µ, ν)
are continuous in W2-distance. Moreover, the growth conditions
|∂xgi(x, µ, ν)| ≤ K + L
(
|x|+M2(µ) +M2(ν)
)
,
|gi(x, µ, ν)| ≤ K + L
(
|x|2 +M2(µ)
2 +M2(ν)
2
)
,
are satisfied.
We first consider the optimal control problem (3.1) for given deterministic flows of probability
measures. The corresponding Hamiltonian for each population Hi : [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)2 × Rd ×
R
d×d ×Ai → R is defined by:
Hi(t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) := 〈bi(t, x, µ, ν, α), y〉 + tr[σi(t, x, µ, ν)
⊤z] + fi(t, x, µ, ν, α) . (3.3)
Since σi is independent of the control parameter, the minimizer αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) of the Hamiltonian
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Hi can also be defined by a reduced Hamiltonian H
(r)
i :
αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) := argminα∈AiH
(r)
i (t, x, µ, ν, y, α) (3.4)
where
H
(r)
i (t, x, µ, ν, y, α) := 〈bi(t, x, µ, ν, α), y〉 + fi(t, x, µ, ν, α).
The following result regarding the regularity of αˆi is a straightforward extension of Lemma 2.1 [8].
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption (MFG-a), for all (t, x, µ, ν, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × P2(R
d)2 × Rd,
there exists a unique minimizer αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) of H
(r)
i , where the map [0, T ]×R
d×P2(R
d)2×Rd ∋
(t, x, µ, ν, y) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) ∈ Ai is measurable. There exist constants C depending only on (L, λ)
and C ′ depending additionally on K such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′, y, y′ ∈ Rd, µ, ν ∈ P2(Rd),
|αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y)| ≤ C
′ +C
(
|x|+ |y|+M2(µ) +M2(ν)
)
|αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y)− αˆi(t, x
′, µ, ν, y′)| ≤ C
(
|x− x′|+ |y − y′|
)
.
Moreover, for any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × Rd, the map P2(R
d)2 ∋ (µ, ν) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) is
continuous with respect to W2-distance:
|αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) − αˆi(t, x, µ
′, ν ′, y)|
≤ (2λ)−1
(
|bi,2(t, µ, ν)− bi,2(t, µ
′, ν ′)||y|+ |∂αfi(t, x, µ, ν, αˆi)− ∂αfi(t, x, µ′, ν ′, αˆi)|
)
where αˆi := αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y).
Proof. To lighten the notation, let us write ρ = (µ, ν) ∈ P2(R
d)2. Since the function Ai ∋ α 7→
H
(r)
i (t, x, ρ, y, α) is strictly convex and once continuously differentiable, αˆi(t, x, ρ, y) is given by the
unique solution to the variational inequality:
∀β ∈ Ai, 〈β − αˆi(t, x, ρ, y), ∂αH
(r)
i (t, x, ρ, y, αˆi(t, x, ρ, y))〉 ≥ 0 . (3.5)
By strict convexity, the measurability is a consequence of the gradient descent algorithm (Lemma
3.3 [10]).
With an arbitrary point βi ∈ Ai, the λ-convexity implies that
H
(r)
i (t, x, ρ, y, βi) ≥ H
(r)
i (t, x, ρ, y, αˆi)
≥ H
(r)
i (t, x, ρ, y, βi) + 〈αˆi − βi, ∂αH
(r)
i (t, x, ρ, y, βi)〉+ λ|αˆi − βi|
2 ,
where αˆi := αˆi(t, x, ρ, y). Hence we have
|αˆi − βi| ≤ λ
−1(|bi,2(t, ρ)||y| + |∂αfi(t, x, ρ, βi)|) . (3.6)
This gives the first growth condition. Next, with αˆi := αˆ(t, x, ρ, y) and αˆ
′
i := αˆt(t, x
′, ρ, y′), the
optimality condition implies
〈αˆ′i − αˆi, ∂αH
(r)
i (t, x, ρ, y, αˆi)− ∂αH
(r)
i (t, x
′, ρ, y′, αˆ′i)〉 ≥ 0 .
This inequality, together with the λ-convexity, gives
〈αˆ′i − αˆi, bi,2(t, ρ) · (y − y
′) + ∂αfi(t, x, ρ, αˆi)− ∂αfi(t, x′, ρ, αˆi)〉 ≥ 2λ|αˆi − αˆ′i|
2,
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and thus |αˆi − αˆ
′
i| ≤ (2λ)
−1(|bi,2(t, ρ)||y − y′| + |∂αfi(t, x, ρ, αˆi) − ∂αfi(t, x′, ρ, αˆi)|). This proves
the Lipschitz continuity in (x, y). The continuity with respect to the measure arguments follows
exactly in the same way.
For given flows µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d)), the adjoint equation of the optimal control problem
(3.1) for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 is given by
dXit = bi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))dt+ σi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t )dW
i
t ,
dY it = −∂xHi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))dt+ Z
i
tdW
i
t , (3.7)
with j 6= i, Xi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d) and Y iT = ∂xgi(X
i
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T ), which is a C(L, λ)-Lipschitz
FBSDE. Notice that Hi must be the full Hamiltonian instead of reduced one due to the state
dependence in σi. Here, ∂xHi has the form:
∂xHi(t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) := bi,1(t, µ, ν)
⊤y + tr[σi,1(t, µ, ν)⊤z] + ∂xfi(t, x, µ, ν, α) .
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption (MFG-a), for any flows µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d)), the adjoint
FBSDE (3.7) for each i ∈ {1, 2} has a unique solution (Xˆit , Yˆ
i
t , Zˆ
i
t)t∈[0,T ] ∈ S2×S2×H2. Moreover,
there exits a measurable function uµ
i,µj
i : [0, T ] × R
d → Rd such that, with some constant C
depending only on (L, λ),
∀t ∈ [0, T ],∀x, x′ ∈ Rd, |uµ
i,µj
i (t, x)− u
µi,µj
i (t, x
′)| ≤ C|x− x′| (3.8)
and also that ∀t ∈ [0, T ], Yˆ it = u
µi,µj
i (t, Xˆ
i
t ), P-a.s.
If we set αˆi = (αˆit = αˆi(t, Xˆ
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Yˆ
i
t ))t∈[0,T ], then for any βi = (βit)t∈[0,T ] ∈ Ai, it holds:
J
µi,µj
i (αˆ
i) + λE
∫ T
0
|βit − αˆ
i
t|
2dt ≤ Jµ
i,µj
i (β
i) . (3.9)
Proof. The last claim regarding the sufficiency of the stochastic maximal principle is well known. In-
deed, if a solution (Xˆit , Yˆ
i
t , Zˆ
i
t)t∈[0,T ] exists, then using the convexity gi(XiT , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )−gi(Xˆ
i
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T ) ≥
〈(XiT − Xˆ
i
T ), ∂xgi(Xˆ
i
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )〉, evaluating the expectation E[〈X
i
T − Xˆ
i
T , Yˆ
i
T 〉] by the Ito formula,
making use of the λ-convexity of the Hamiltonian, we get the desired result. Here, (Xit)t∈[0,T ] with
Xi0 = ξ
i denotes the solution of the SDE (3.7) with βi instead of αˆi as its control. See, for example,
Theorem 6.4.6 in [31].
The existence of a unique solution to the adjoint FBSDE as wall as the Lipschitz continuous
decoupling field follows from a straightforward extension of Lemma 3.5 in [8]. First, since the adjoint
FBSDE (3.7) is C(L, λ)-Lipschitz continuous in (x, y, z) and σi is independent of Z
i, Theorem 1.1
in [15] guarantees the existence of a unique solution for small time T ≤ c, where c = c(L, λ) is a
constant depending only on (L, λ). Thus, for a general T , we still have the unique solvability on
[T − δ, T ] with 0 < δ ≤ c and any initial condition ξi ∈ L2(Ω,Ft0 ,P;R
d) at t0 ∈ [T − δ, T ]. We let
(Xi,t0,ξ
i
t , Y
i,t0,ξi
t , Z
i,t0,ξi
t )t∈[t0,T ] denote this solution. Following the proof of Theorem 2.6 in [15] (see
also Proposition 4.8 in [10]), we can establish the existence and uniqueness on the whole [0, T ] by
connecting the short-term solutions provided we have
∀x, y ∈ Rd, |Y i,t0,xt0 − Y
i,t0,y
t0 | ≤ C|x− y| , (3.10)
for some C independent of t0 and δ. Here, by Blumenthal’s zero-one law, Y
i,t0,x
t0 and Y
i,t0,y
t0 are
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deterministic. We are now going to prove (3.10). Let us put
Jˆ
t0,x
i := E
[∫ T
t0
fi(t,X
i,t0,x
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,t0,x
t )dt+ gi(X
i,t0,x
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
,
with αˆi,t0,xt := αˆi(t,X
i,t0,x
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,t0,x
t ). Then similar arguments deriving the relation (3.9) gives
〈y − x, Y t0,xt0 〉+ Jˆ
t0,x
i + λE
∫ T
t0
|αˆi,t0,yt − αˆ
i,t0,x
t |
2dt ≤ J t0,yi . (3.11)
Exchanging the role of x and y in (3.11) and adding the two inequalities, we obtain that
2λE
∫ T
t0
|αˆi,t0,xt − αˆ
i,t0,y
t |
2dt ≤ 〈x− y, Y i,t0,xt0 − Y
i,t0,y
t0 〉 . (3.12)
Now, treating the controls αˆi,t0,x, αˆi,t0,y as well as the forward varibles Xi,t0,x,Xi,t0,y as external
inputs, we apply the standard stability result of Lipschitz BSDEs (e.g., see Theorem 4.2.3 in [36])
to obtain the estimate for E[supt∈[t0,T ] |Y
i,t0,x
t − Y
i,t0,y
t |
2]. Then, applying the standard stability
result of Lipschitz SDEs (e.g., see Theorem 3.24 in [36]) to this estimate gives
E
[
sup
t∈[t0,T ]
|Xi,t0,xt −X
i,t0,y
t |
2 + sup
t∈[t0,T ]
|Y i,t0,xt − Y
i,t0,y
t |
2
]
≤ C(L)
(
|x− y|2 + E
∫ T
t0
|αˆi,t0,xt − αˆ
i,t0,y
t |
2dt
)
.
Now the inequality (3.12) proves the relation (3.10) with C depending only on (L, λ), and hence
also the existence of a unique solution for general T . The decoupling field is defined by uµ
i,µj
i :
[0, T ] × Rd ∋ (t, x) 7→ Y i,t,xt , and the representation P
(
∀t ∈ [0, T ], Yˆ it = u
µi,µj
i (t, Xˆ
i
t)
)
= 1 follows
from the uniqueness of the solution as well as its continuity (Corollary 1.5 in [15]). Its Lipschitz
continuity is a direct result of (3.10).
Remark 3.2. In the remainder, we often use the simpler notation ui for the decoupling field without
the superscripts (µi,µj).
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that two set of functions (bi, σi, fi, gi) and (b
′
i, σ
′
i, f
′
i , g
′
i) satisfy Assumption
(MFG-a). For given inputs ξi, ξ′,i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;Rd) and (µi,µj), (µ′,i,µ′,j) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(Rd))2,
let us denote the corresponding solution to (3.7) by (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ] and (X
′,i
t , Y
′,i
t , Z
′,i
t )t∈[0,T ],
respectively. Then, there exists a constant C depending only on (L, λ) such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xit −X
′,i
t |
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y it − Y
′,i
t |
2 +
∫ T
0
|Zit − Z
′,i
t |
2dt
]
≤ CE
[
|ξi − ξ′,i|2 + |∂xgi(XiT , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )− ∂xg
′
i(X
i
T , µ
′,i
T , µ
′,j
T )|
2
+
∫ T
0
|bi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))− b
′
i(t,X
i
t , µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , αˆ
′
i(t,X
i
t , µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , Y
i
t ))|
2dt
+
∫ T
0
|σi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t)− σ
′
i(t,X
i
t , µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t )|
2dt+
∫ T
0
(
|∂xHi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))
−∂xH
′
i(t,X
i
t , µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆ
′
i(t,X
i
t , µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , Y
i
t ))|
2
)
dt
]
, (3.13)
where the functions Hi,H
′
i : [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)2 × Rd × Rd×d × Ai → R are the Hamiltonians
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(3.3) associated with the coefficients (bi, σi, fi) and (b
′
i, σ
′
i, f
′
i), respectively, and αˆi, αˆ
′
i are their
minimizers. In particular, there is another constant C ′ depending additionally on K such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xit |
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y it |
2 +
∫ T
0
|Zit |
2dt
]
≤ C
(
||ξi||22 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
j=1
M2(µ
j
t )
2
)
+ C ′, (3.14)
and, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
|Y it | ≤ C
(
|Xit |+ sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
j=1
M2(µ
j
t)
)
+ C ′, P-a.s. (3.15)
Proof. Since the FBSDE (3.7) has Lipschitz continuous coefficients, it is standard to show that
there exists some constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that the estimate (3.13) holds for small
T ≤ c. In particular, by applying Ito formula to |Y it − Y
′,i
t |
2, we see that E[supt∈[0,T ] |Y it − Y
′,i
t |
2 +∫ T
0 |Z
i
t − Z
′,i
t |
2] is bounded by the terms related to the backward equation in (3.13) plus the term
CE[supt∈[0,T ] |Xit −X
′,i
t |
2]. On the other hand, the similar calculation shows that E[supt∈[0,T ] |Xit −
X
′,i
t |
2] is bounded by the remaining terms in (3.13) plus CTE[supt∈[0,T ] |Y it −Y
i,′
t |
2] where C depends
only on the Lipschitz constants of the system. Hence, for small T ≤ c, we obtain the desired
estimate.
For general T , the estimate is a result of connecting the short-term estimates (Lemma 4.9 [10]).
Since the same technique will be used also in Lemma 4.3, let us explain it here in details. We first
divide the interval [0, T ] into finite number of subintervals ([Tk−1, Tk])1≤k≤N with T0 = 0, TN = T
and Tk − Tk−1 ≤ c for each k. The estimate for Θ(Tk−1, Tk) := E
[
supt∈[Tk−1,Tk] |X
i
t − X
′,i
t |
2 +
supt∈[Tk−1,Tk] |Y
i
t − Y
′,i
t |
2 +
∫ Tk
Tk−1
|Zit − Z
′,i
t |
2dt
]
on each interval can be written in the from
Θ(Tk−1, Tk) ≤ CE
[
|XiTk−1 −X
′,i
Tk−1
|2 + |(ui − u
′
i)(Tk,X
i
Tk
)|2
+
∫ Tk
Tk−1
|(bi − b
′
i, σi − σ
′
i, ∂xHi − ∂xH
′
i)(s,X
i
s, Y
i
s , Z
i
s)|
2ds
]
where we have used the notation ui := u
µi,µj
i , u
′
i := u
′,µ′,i,µ′,j
i and omitted the arguments regarding
(µj,µ′,j)1≤j≤2 to lighten the expression. The Lipschitz continuity in (3.8) is crucial to derive this
expression. For k = N , it gives Θ(TN−1, TN ) ≤ CE
[
|XiTN−1−X
′,i
TN−1
|2+|δT |
2+
∫ T
TN−1
|δhs|
2ds
]
where
δT := (∂xgi−∂xg
′
i)(T,X
i
T ) and δhs := (bi−b
′
i, σi−σ
′
i, ∂xHi−∂xH
′
i)(s,X
i
s, Y
i
s , Z
i
s). This means, in par-
ticular, E
[
|(ui−u
′
i)(TN−1,X
i
TN−1
)|2
]
≤ CE
[
|XiTN−1−X
′,i
TN−1
|2+|δT |
2+
∫ T
TN−1
|δhs|
2ds
]
. Since it holds
for any initial value X ′,iTN−1 , we obtain E
[
|(ui−u
′
i)(TN−1,X
i
TN−1
)|2
]
≤ CE
[
|δT |
2+
∫ TN
TN−1
|δhs|
2ds
]
by
choosing X ′,iTN−1 = X
i
TN−1
. This estimate then implies Θ(TN−2, TN−1) ≤ CE
[
|XiTN−2 −X
′,i
TN−2
|2 +
|δT |
2 +
∫ T
TN−2
|δhs|
2ds
]
. By iteration, we get for any k,
Θ(Tk, Tk+1) ≤ CE
[
|XiTk −X
′,i
Tk
|2 + |δT |
2 +
∫ T
Tk
|δhs|
2ds
]
. (3.16)
Moreover, by iterating the relation E
[
|XiTk−X
′,i
Tk
|2
]
≤ CE
[
|XiTk−1−X
′,i
Tk−1
|2+|δT |
2+
∫ T
Tk−1
|δhs|
2ds
]
,
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we get
E
[
|XiTk −X
′,i
Tk
|2
]
≤ CE
[
|ξi − ξ′,i|2 + |δT |2 +
∫ T
0
|δhs|
2ds
]
. (3.17)
Inserting the estimate (3.17) into (3.16) and summing over k, we obtain the desired estimate.
In order to obtain the growth estimate, we put, for any (t, x, µ, ν, α) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×P2(R
d)2×Ai,
bi(t, x, µ, ν, α) = σi(t, x, µ, ν) = gi(x, µ, ν) = 0 , fi(t, x, µ, ν, α) = λ|α|
2 ,
and ξi = 0, which then satisfies Assumption (MFG-a) and makes (Xi, Y i, Zi) identically zero.
Plugging them into (3.13), we obtain the estimate:
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X ′,it |
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y ′,it |
2 +
∫ T
0
|Z ′,it |
2dt
]
≤ C
(
||ξ′,i||22 + |∂xg
′
i(0, µ
′,i
T , µ
′,j
T )|
2 +
∫ T
0
|∂xf
′
i(t, 0, µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , αˆ
′
i(t, 0, µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , 0))|
2dt
+
∫ T
0
[
|b′i(t, 0, µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , αˆ
′
i(t, 0, µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t , 0))|
2 + |σ′i(t, 0, µ
′,i
t , µ
′,j
t )|
2
]
dt
)
. (3.18)
Now, by symmetry, the desired estimate (3.14) holds for (Xi, Y i, Zi). Finally, using the initial
condition Xit = 0 at time t yields
|Y i,t,0t | ≤ E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y i,t,0s |
2
] 1
2
≤ C sup
s∈[t,T ]
2∑
j=1
M2(µ
j
s) + C
′.
Now, by the Lipschitz continuity (3.8)(or equivalently (3.10)), we have |Y it − Y
i,t,0
t | = |Y
i,t,Xit
t −
Y
i,t,0
t | ≤ C|X
i
t |. This proves the growth estimate (3.15).
3.3 MFG equilibrium under boundedness assumptions
In preceding subsections, we have seen that, for given deterministic flows of probability measures
µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d)), the solution to each optimal control problem of (3.1) is characterized by
the uniquely solvable FBSDE (3.7). Hence finding an equilibrium condition (3.2) results in finding a
solution to the following system of FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov (MKV) type: for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i;
dXit = bi
(
t,Xit ,L(X
i
t ),L(X
j
t ), αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), Y
i
t )
)
dt+ σi
(
t,Xit ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t )
)
dW it ,
dY it = −∂xHi
(
t,Xit ,L(X
i
t ),L(X
j
t ), Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), Y
i
t )
)
dt+ ZitdW
i
t , (3.19)
with Xi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d) and Y iT = ∂xgi(X
i
T ,L(X
i
T ),L(X
j
T )). Although two MKV-type
FBSDEs are now coupled, their interactions appear only through the laws of the two populations.
Thanks to this property, we can still apply a similar strategy developed by Carmona & Delarue
[8, 7]. A crucial tool to prove the existence of an equilibrium is the Schauder’s fixed point theorem
[32] generalized by Tychonoff [35]1. The following form is taken from Theorem 4.32 in [10].
Theorem 3.2. (Schauder FPT) Let (V, || · ||) be a normed linear vector space and E be a nonempty
closed convex subset of V . Then, any continuous mapping from E into itself which has a relatively
compact range has a fixed point.
1See, for example Shapiro [33], for pedagogical introduction of fixed-point theorems and relevant references.
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In this subsection, we prove the existence of a solution to the system of FBSDEs (3.19) under
additional assumptions.
Assumption 3.2. (MFG-b) For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, there exist some element 0Ai ∈ Ai and a constant Λ
such that, for any (t, µ, ν) ∈ [0, T ]× P2(R
d)2,
|bi,0(t, µ, ν)|, |σi,0(t, µ, ν)| ≤ Λ ,
|∂xgi(0, µ, ν)|, |∂(x,α)fi(t, 0, µ, ν, 0Ai)| ≤ Λ .
Here is the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 3.3. Under Assumptions (MFG-a,b), the system of FBSDEs (3.19) (and hence the
matching problem (3.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d).
Proof. With slight abuse of notation, we let (Xi,ρt , Y
i,ρ
t , Z
i,ρ
t )t∈[0,T ] denote the solution to the FB-
SDE (3.7) for a given flows ρ := (µ1,µ2) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 and the initial condition Xi,ρ0 = ξ
i.
By Theorem 3.1, we can define a map:
Φ : C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 ∋ (µ1,µ2) 7→ (L(X1,ρt )t∈[0,T ],L(X
2,ρ
t )t∈[0,T ]) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 .
In the following, we are going to check the conditions necessary for the application of Schauder FPT
to this map. As a linear vector space V in the FPT, we use the product space C([0, T ];M1f (R
d))2
equipped with the supremum of the Kantorovich-Rubinstein norm:
||(µ1,µ2)|| :=
2∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
||µit||KR∗ , (3.20)
with : ||µ||KR∗ := |µ(R
d)|+ sup
{∫
Rd
l(x)µ(dx); l ∈ Lip1(R
d), l(0) = 0
}
,
where Lip1(R
d) is the set of 1-Lipschitz continuous functions on Rd. Importantly, the norm || · ||KR∗
is known to coincide with the 1-Wasserstein distance W1 on P1(R
d) (Corollary 5.4 in [10]). Of
course, the reason to use a space of signed measures is to make it linear.
From (3.6) with (βi = 0Ai), it is immediate to see that |αˆi(t, 0, ρ, 0)| ≤ C(λ,Λ). Hence, by using
the estimate (3.18) in Lemma 3.2, we get E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |Y
i,ρ
t |
2
]
≤ C(L, λ,Λ)(1 + ||ξi||22). Then the
Lipschitz continuity of the decoupling field implies that |Y i,ρt | ≤ C
(
1+ |Xi,ρt |
)
with C independent
of ρ. Therefore, again by (3.6), we have |αˆi(t,X
i,ρ
t , ρt, Y
i,ρ
t )| ≤ C(1 + |X
i,ρ
t |). Now, it is standard
to check that E
[
|Xi,ρt −X
i,ρ
s |2
]
≤ C|t− s| and hence
W2(L(X
i,ρ
t ),L(X
i,ρ
s )) ≤ C|t− s|
1
2 (3.21)
holds uniformly in ρ. Since αˆi is of linear growth in X
i,ρ
t , it is also straightforward to obtain
E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,ρ
t |
4|F0
] 1
2
≤ C
(
1 + |ξi|2) uniformly in ρ. This inequality guarantees the uniform
square integrability. In fact, the following estimate holds uniformly in ρ with any a ≥ 1;2
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,ρt |
21{supt∈[0,T ] |Xi,ρt |≥a}
]
≤ C
(
a−1 + E
[
|ξi|21{|ξi|≥√a}
]) 12
. (3.22)
Since the relation will be used repeatedly in the following, let us explain it here. For any D ∈ F
2See p. 259 in [10].
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and ǫ > 0, we have, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,ρt |
21D
]
≤ CE
[
(1 + |ξi|2)P(D|F0)
1
2
]
≤ C
(
ǫ+ ǫ−1E
[
(1 + |ξi|2)1D
])
≤ CE
[
(1 + |ξi|2)1D
] 1
2 .
In the last inequality, we have maximized in ǫ. Here, C depends on ||ξi||2 but not on ρ. We also
have
sup
D∈F ;P(D)≤Ca−2
E
[
(1 + |ξi|2)1D
]
≤ Ca−2 + E
[
|ξi|2(1{|ξi|≤√a} + 1{|ξi|≥√a})
]
≤ 2Ca−1 + E
[
|ξi|21{|ξi|≥√a}
]
.
Since P
(
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,ρ
t | ≥ a
)
≤ Ca−2 by Chevyshev’s inequality, the estimate (3.22) is now estab-
lished.
The above estimate suggests us to restrict the map Φ to the following domain:
E :=
{
(µ1,µ2) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2;
∀a ≥ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫
|x|≥a
|x|2µit(dx) ≤ C
(
a−1 + E
[
|ξi|21{|ξi|≥√a}
]) 12}
,
which is a closed and convex subset of C([0, T ];M1f (R
d))2. Choosing C sufficiently large, we can
make Φ a self-map on E . By the estimate (3.22) and Corollary 5.6 in [10], there exists a compact
subset K ⊂ P2(R
d)2 such that ∀t ∈ [0, T ], [Φ(ρ)]t ∈ K for any ρ ∈ E . Combined with the
equicontinuity (3.21), Arzela-Ascoli theorem implies that the image Φ(E) is a relatively compact
subset of C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2, and in particular of C([0, T ];P1(R
d))2.
Finally, by Lemma 3.2 and also by the continuity of coefficients in the measure arguments in
W2-distance, the dominated convergence theorem implies that E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,ρ
t − X
i,ρ′
t |
2
]
→ 0
when 1 ≤ i ≤ 2,∀t ∈ [0, T ],W2(µ
i
t, µ
′,i
t ) → 0. Note that, by Theorem 5.5 in [10], when ρ converge
with respect to the norm || · || in (3.20) under the restriction to the domain E , ρ actually converges
in W2-distance. This proves the continuity of the map Φ. Now the existence of a fixed point (not
necessarily unique) of the map Φ is guaranteed by Schauder FPT, which provides a solution to the
system of FBSDEs (3.19).
3.4 MFG equilibrium for small T or small coupling
In order to allow the quadratic cost functions relevant for popular Linear-Quadratic problems, we
want to relax Assumption (MFG-b). This is exactly what Carmona & Delarue have done in [8] for
single population. Although we can follow the same route, it requires much stronger assumptions
than (MFG-a). Unfortunately, the conditions required in [8] preclude most of the interesting
interactions among different populations through their state dynamics. In this work, in order to
allow flexible interactions among populations and also to be complementary to the result in [8],
we focus on the problems with small T . Requiring small T is a reasonable trade-off for quadratic
interactions by considering the fact that, even for a deterministic LQ-problem, the relevant Riccati
equation may diverge within a finite time. After the analysis for small T , we provide another
solution which allows general T but requires the couplings between FSDE and BSDE are small
enough.
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Theorem 3.4. Under Assumption (MFG-a), there exists some positive constant c depending
only on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c, the system of FBSDEs (3.19) (and hence the matching
problem (3.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d).
Proof. For any n ∈ N and µ ∈ P2(R
d), let us define φn ◦ µ as a push-forward of µ by the map
R
d ∋ x 7→
nx
max(M2(µ), n)
. In other words, for any random variable X with L(X) = µ, the law of
nX
max(M2(µ), n)
is given by φn ◦µ. Obviously, M2(φn ◦µ) ≤ n and the map µ 7→ φn ◦µ is continuous
with respect to W2-distance. Using this map, we introduce a sequence of approximated functions
(bni,0, b
n
i,2, σ
n
i,0)(t, µ, ν) := (bi,0, bi,2, σi,0)(t, φn ◦ µ, φn ◦ ν) ,
fni (t, x, µ, ν, α) := fi(t, x, φn ◦ µ, φn ◦ ν, α), g
n
i (x, µ, ν) := gi(x, φn ◦ µ, φn ◦ ν),
and accordingly define
bni (t, x, µ, ν, α) := b
n
i,0(t, µ, ν) + bi,1(t, µ, ν)x+ b
n
i,2(t, µ, ν)α ,
σni (t, x, µ, ν) := σ
n
i,0(t, µ, ν) + σi,1(t, µ, ν)x ,
Hni (t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) := 〈b
n
i (t, x, µ, ν, α), y〉 + tr[σ
n
i (t, x, µ, ν)
⊤z] + fni (t, x, µ, ν, α) ,
for any (t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd ×P2(R
d)2 ×Rd ×Rd×d×Ai. Since ∂αHni (t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) =
bi,2(t, φn◦µ, φn◦ν)
⊤y+∂αfi(t, x, φn◦µ, φn◦ν, α), the minimizer given as a solution to the variational
inequality (3.5) satisfies
αˆni (t, x, µ, ν, y) = αˆi(t, x, φn ◦ µ, φn ◦ ν, y) , (3.23)
where αˆi is the minimizer of the original Hamiltonian Hi. The regularization for bi,2 is done solely
to obtain the simple expression (3.23) for the minimizer.
The new coefficient functions (bni , σ
n
i , f
n
i , g
n
i ) clearly satisfy (MFG-a,b) for each n. Thus
Theorem 3.3 guarantees that there exists a solution to the following system of FBSDEs of MKV-
type with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i:
dX
i,n
t = b
n
i (t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ), αˆ
n
i (t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ), Y
i,n
t ))dt
+σni (t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ))dW
i
t , (3.24)
dY
i,n
t = −∂xH
n
i (t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ), Y
i,n
t , Z
i,n
t , αˆ
n
i (t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ), Y
i,n
t ))dt+ Z
i,n
t dW
i
t ,
with Xi,n0 = ξ
i and Y i,nT = ∂xg
n
i (X
i,n
T ,L(X
i,n
T ),L(X
j,n
T )). Treating (L(X
i,n
t ))1≤i≤2 as inputs, we can
see that there exist some constants C = C(L, λ) and C ′ = C ′(L, λ,K) such that
|Y i,nt | ≤ C
(
|Xi,nt |+ sup
s∈[t,T ]
2∑
j=1
M2(L(X
j,n
s ))
)
+C ′.
from the growth estimate in Lemma 3.2. It then follows from Lemma 3.1 that
|αˆni (t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ), Y
i,n
t )| ≤ C
(
|Xi,nt |+ sup
s∈[t,T ]
2∑
j=1
M2(L(X
j,n
s ))
)
+ C ′,
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uniformly in n. Then, for any t ∈ [0, T ], it is easy to check that
E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ CE
[
|ξi|2 +
∫ t
0
[
|bi(s,X
i,n
s ,L(X
i,n
s ),L(X
j,n
s ), αˆ
n
i (t))|
2 + |σi(t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ))|
2dt
]
≤ C ′ + C
(
||ξi||22 + T sup
s∈[0,T ]
2∑
j=1
M2(L(X
j,n
s ))
2
)
+ C
∫ t
0
2∑
j=1
E
[
|Xj,ns |
2
]
ds , (3.25)
with C = C(L, λ). Applying Gronwall’s inequality to the summation over 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we get
sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ C ′ + C
(
||ξ||22 + T sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
M2(L(X
i,n
t ))
2
)
,
with ξ := (ξ1, ξ2). Therefore, there exists a constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that, for any
T ≤ c,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ C ′
(
1 + ||ξ||22
)
(3.26)
uniformly in n.
Let us assume T ≤ c in the remainder. From (3.26), we can show straightforwardly that
E
[
|Xi,nt −X
i,n
s |2
]
≤ C|t− s| and E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,n
t |
4|F0
] 1
2 ≤ C
(
1 + |ξi|2
)
hold uniformly in n. Just
as in (3.22), we have for any a ≥ 1,
sup
n≥1
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,nt |
21{supt∈[0,T ] |Xi,nt |≥a}
]
≤ C
(
a−1 + E
[
|ξi|21{|ξi|≥√a}
]) 12
.
Hence, combined with the equicontinuity, we conclude that (L(X1,nt )t∈[0,T ],L(X
2,n
t )t∈[0,T ])n≥1 is a
relatively compact subset of C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2. Therefore, there exists some (µ1,µ2) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2
such that, upon extracting some subsequence (still denoted by n),
lim
n→∞ supt∈[0,T ]
W2(L(X
i,n
t ), µ
i
t) = 0, i ∈ {1, 2} .
Let us define (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ],1≤i≤2 as the solutions to the FBSDEs (3.7) with those (µ1,µ2)
as inputs. The convergence E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,n
t − X
i
t |
2
]
→ 0 as n → ∞ can be shown by the
stability result in Lemma 3.2. Note that, thanks to the boundedness of (3.26), there exists
n0 ∈ N such that we can replace all the approximated coefficients (b
n
i , σ
n
i , f
n
i , g
n
i , αˆ
n
i ) by the orig-
inal ones (bi, σi, fi, gi, αˆi) for any n ≥ n0. The convergence E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,n
t − X
i
t |
2
]
→ 0 then
follows easily by the dominated convergence theorem. By the inequality supt∈[0,T ]W2(L(Xit), µit) ≤
supt∈[0,T ]
(
W2(L(X
i
t),L(X
i,n
t ))+W2(L(X
i,n
t ), µ
i
t)
)
, the above convergence implies µi = L(Xit)t∈[0,T ]
1 ≤ i ≤ 2. Therefore, (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ],1≤i≤2 is actually a wanted solution to the system of FBSDEs
(3.19).
Another simple method to allow the quadratic cost functions is making the couplings between
FSDE and BSDE small enough.
Theorem 3.5. Under Assumption (MFG-a) and a given T , the system of FBSDEs (3.19) (and
hence the matching problem (3.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d) if λ−1||bi,2||∞, 1 ≤
i ≤ 2 are small enough.
Proof. By the growth estimate for αˆi in (3.6), it is straightforward to check that the term involving
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sups∈[0,T ]M2(L(X
j,n
s ))2 in (3.25) is proportional to λ−1||bi,2||∞. Thus, by making λ−1||bi,2||∞ small
enough for a given T , we obtain the same estimate (3.26). The remaining procedures for the proof
are exactly the same as in Theorem 3.4.
Remark 3.3. As one can see, there is no difficulty to generalize all the analyses in Section 3 for
any finite number of populations 1 ≤ i ≤ m. It results in a search for a fixed point in the map
C([0, T ];P2(R
d))m ∋ (µi)mi=1 7→ (L(X
i
t)t∈[0,T ])mi=1 ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))m, which can be done in the
same way.
4 Games among Cooperative Populations
In this section, we try to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium between two competing
populations within each of which the agents share the same cost functions as well as the coefficient
functions of the state dynamics. The difference from the situation studied in Section 3 is that the
agents within each population now cooperate by using the common feedback strategy, say, under
the command of a central planner. This results in a control problem of McKean-Vlasov type in the
large population limit. See Chapter 6 in [10] to understand the details how the large population
limit of cooperative agents induces a control problem of MKV type. The current problem has been
discussed in Section 3 in Bensoussan et.al.[3] in the name Nash Mean Field Type Control Problem,
where the necessary conditions of the optimality are provided in the form of a master equation.
In this section, we adopt the probabilistic approach developed in Carmona & Delarue (2015) [9]
for single population, and then provide several sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium.
4.1 Definition of Nash Mean Field Type Control Problem
Let us first formulate the problem to be studied in this section.
(i) Fix any two deterministic flows of probability measures (µi = (µit)t∈[0,T ])i∈{1,2} given on Rd.
(ii) Solve the two optimal control problems of McKean-Vlasov type
inf
α1∈A1
J
µ2
1 (α
1), inf
α2∈A2
J
µ1
2 (α
2) (4.1)
over some admissible strategies Ai (i ∈ {1, 2}), where
J
µ2
1 (α
1) := E
[∫ T
0
f1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , α
1
t )dt+ g1(X
1
T ,L(X
1
T ), µ
2
T )
]
,
J
µ1
2 (α
2) := E
[∫ T
0
f2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ), µ
1
t , α
2
t )dt+ g2(X
2
T ,L(X
2
T ), µ
1
T )
]
,
subject to the d-dimensional diffusion dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type:
dX1t = b1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , α
1
t )dt+ σ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t )dW
1
t ,
dX2t = b2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ), µ
1
t , α
2
t )dt+ σ2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ), µ
1
t )dW
2
t ,
for t ∈ [0, T ] with
(
Xi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d)
)
1≤i≤2. For each population i ∈ {1, 2}, we sup-
pose, as before, that Ai is the set of Ai-valued F
i-progressively measurable processes αi satisfying
E
∫ T
0 |α
i
t|
2dt <∞ and Ai ⊂ R
k is closed and convex.
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(iii) Find a pair of probability flows (µ1,µ2) as a solution to the matching problem:
∀t ∈ [0, T ], µ1t = L(Xˆ
1,µ2
t ), µ
2
t = L(Xˆ
2,µ1
t ) , (4.2)
where (Xˆi,µ
j
)i∈{1,2},j 6=i are the solutions to the optimal control problems in (ii).
4.2 Optimization for given flows of probability measures
In this subsection, we consider the step (ii) in the above formulation. Before giving the set of
main assumptions, let us mention the notion of differentiability for functions defined on the space
of probability measures. We adopt the notion of L-differentiability used in [9], which was first
introduced by Lions in his lecture at the College de France (see the lecture notes summarized in
[6]), where the differentiation is based on the lifting of functions P2(R
d) ∋ µ→ u(µ) to functions u˜
defined on a Hilbert space L2(Ω,F ,P;Rd) by u˜(X) := u(L(X)) with X ∈ L2(Ω,F ,P;Rd) over some
probability space (Ω,F ,P) with Ω being a Polish space and P an atomless probability measure.
Definition 4.1. (Definition 5.22 in [10]) A function u on P2(R
d) is said to be L-differentiable at
µ0 ∈ P2(R
d) if there exists a random variable X0 with law µ0 such that the lifted function u˜ is
Frechet differentiable at X0.
By Proposition 5.24 [10], if u is L-differentiable at µ0 in the sense of Definition 4.1, then u˜ is
differentiable at any X ′0 with L(X
′
0) = µ0 and the law of the pair (X
′
0,Du˜(X
′
0)) is independent
of the choice of the random variable X ′0. Thus the L-derivative may be denoted by ∂µu(µ0)(·) :
R
d ∋ x 7→ ∂µu(µ0)(x) ∈ R
d, which is uniquely defined µ0-almost everywhere on R
d. It satisfies,
according to the definition, that:
u(µ) = u(µ0) + E
[
〈X −X0, ∂µu(L(X0))(X0)〉
]
+ o(||X −X0||2) ,
whenever the random variables X and X0 have the distributions L(X) = µ, L(X0) = µ0. For
example, if the function u is of the form u(µ) :=
∫
Rd
h(x)µ(dx) for some function h : Rd → R, we
have u˜(X) = E[h(X)] by a random varibale X with L(X) = µ. If the function h is differentiable,
the definition of L-derivative implies that ∂µu(µ)(·) = ∂xh(·). For details of L-derivatives, their
regularity properties and examples, see Section 6 in [6] and Chapter 5 in [10]. We now give the
main assumptions in this section:3
Assumption 4.1. (MFTC-a) L,K ≥ 0 and λ > 0 are some constants. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, the
measurable functions bi : [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)2 × Ai → R
d, σi : [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)2 → Rd×d,
fi : [0, T ]× R
d × P2(R
d)2 ×Ai → R, and gi : R
d × P2(R
d)2 → R satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) The functions bi and σi are affine in (x, α, µ¯) in the sense that, for any (t, x, µ, ν, α) ∈
[0, T ] ×Rd × P2(R
d)2 ×Ai,
bi(t, x, µ, ν, α) := bi,0(t, ν) + bi,1(t, ν)x+ b¯i,1(t, ν)µ¯ + bi,2(t, ν)α ,
σi(t, x, µ, ν) := σi,0(t, ν) + σi,1(t, ν)x+ σ¯i,1(t, ν)µ¯ ,
where µ¯ :=
∫
Rd
xµ(dx), and bi,0, bi,1, b¯i,1, bi,2, σi,0, σi,1 and σ¯i,1 defined on [0, T ] × P2(R
d) are Rd,
R
d×d, Rd×d, Rd×k, Rd×d, Rd×d×d and Rd×d×d-valued measurable functions, respectively.
(A2) For any t ∈ [0, T ], the functions P2(R
d) ∋ ν 7→ (bi,0, bi,1, b¯i,1, bi,2, σi,0, σi,1, σ¯i,1)(t, ν) are
continuous in W2-distance. Moreover for any (t, ν) ∈ [0, T ] ×P2(R
d),
|bi,0(t, ν)|, |σi,0(t, ν)| ≤ K + LM2(ν) ,
|bi,1(t, ν)|, |b¯i,1(t, ν)|, |bi,2(t, ν)|, |σi,1(t, ν)|, |σ¯i,1(t, ν)| ≤ L .
3We slightly abuse the notation to lighten the expression.
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(A3) For any t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd, µ, µ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd) and α,α′ ∈ Ai, the functions fi and gi satisfy
the quadratic growth conditions
|fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)| ≤ K + L
(
|x|2 + |α|2 +M2(µ)
2 +M2(ν)
2
)
,
|gi(x, µ, ν)| ≤ K + L
(
|x|2 +M2(µ)
2 +M2(ν)
2
)
,
and the local Lipschitz continuity
|fi(t, x
′, µ′, ν, α′)− fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)| + |gi(x′, µ′, ν)− gi(x, µ, ν)|
≤
(
K + L
[
|(x′, α′)|+ |(x, α)| +M2(µ′) +M2(µ) +M2(ν)]
)[
|(x′, α′)− (x, α)| +W2(µ′, µ)
]
.
(A4) The functions fi and gi are once continuously differentiable in (x, α) and x respectively, and
their derivatives are L-Lipschitz continuous with respect to (x, α, µ) and (x, µ) i.e.
|∂(x,α)fi(t, x
′, µ′, ν, α′)− ∂(x,α)fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)| + |∂xgi(x
′, µ′, ν)− ∂xgi(x, µ, ν)|
≤ L
(
|x′ − x|+ |α′ − α|+W2(µ′, µ)
)
,
for any t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd, µ, µ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd), α, α′ ∈ Ai. The derivatives also satisfy the growth
condition
|∂(x,α)fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)| + |∂xgi(x, µ, ν)| ≤ K + L
(
|x|+ |α|+M2(µ) +M2(ν)
)
.
Moreover, the derivatives ∂(x,α)fi and ∂xgi are continuous also in ν with respect to the W2-distance.
(A5) The functions fi and gi are L-differentiable with respect to the first measure argument µ and
they satisfy that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd, µ, µ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd), α, α′ ∈ Ai and any random variables
X,X ′ with L(X) = µ, L(X ′) = µ′, L-Lipschitz continuity in L2 i.e.,
||∂µfi(t, x
′, µ′, ν, α′)(X ′)− ∂µfi(t, x, µ, ν, α)(X)||2 + ||∂µgi(x′, µ′, ν)(X ′)− ∂µgi(x, µ, ν)(X)||2
≤ L
(
|x′ − x|+ |α′ − α|+ ||X ′ −X||2
)
,
as well as the following growth condition:
||∂µfi(t, x, µ, ν, α)(X)||2 + ||∂µgi(x, µ, ν)(X)||2 ≤ K + L
(
|x|+ |α|+M2(µ) +M2(ν)
)
.
Moreover, the maps P2(R
d) ∋ ν 7→ ∂µfi(t, x, µ, ν, α)(v) and P2(R
d) ∋ ν 7→ ∂µgi(x, µ, ν)(v) are
continuous with respect to W2-distance for any (t, x, µ, α) ∈ [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)× Ai, and µ-a.e.
v ∈ Rd.
(A6) For any t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rd, µ, µ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd), α, α′ ∈ Ai, and any random variables X,X ′
with L(X) = µ,L(X ′) = µ′, the functions fi and gi satisfy the convexity relations:
fi(t, x
′, µ′, ν, α′)− fi(t, x, µ, ν, α) − 〈(x′ − x, α′ − α), ∂(x,α)fi(t, x, µ, ν, α)〉
−E
[
〈X ′ −X, ∂µfi(t, x, µ, ν, α)(X)〉] ≥ λ|α′ − α|2 ,
gi(x
′, µ′, ν)− gi(x, µ, ν)− 〈x′ − x, ∂xgi(x, µ, ν)〉 − E
[
〈X ′ −X, ∂µgi(x, µ, ν)(X)〉
]
≥ 0 .
Remark 4.1. By Lemma 3.3 in [9], the Lipschitz continuity in (A5) above implies that we can
modify ∂µfi(t, x, µ, ν, α)(·) and ∂µgi(x, µ, ν)(·) on a µ-negligible set in such a way that, ∀v, v
′ ∈ Rd
|∂µfi(t, x, µ, ν, α)(v
′)− ∂µfi(t, x, µ, ν, α)(v)| ≤ L|v′ − v| ,
|∂µgi(x, µ, ν)(v
′)− ∂µgi(x, µ, ν)(v)| ≤ L|v′ − v| ,
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for any (t, x, µ, ν, α) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × P2(R
d)2 × Ai. In the remainder of the work, we always use
these Lipschitz continuous versions.
As before, we first consider the optimal control problem (4.1) for given deterministic flows of
probability measures. The Hamiltonian for each population Hi : [0, T ]×R
d×P2(R
d)2×Rd×Rd×d×
Ai ∋ (t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) 7→ Hi(t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) ∈ R and its minimizer αˆi : [0, T ] × R
d × P2(R
d)2 ×
R
d ∋ (t, x, µ, ν, y) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) ∈ Ai are defined in the same way as (3.3) and (3.4) with the
coefficients replaced by those given in the current section.
Lemma 4.1. Under Assumption (MFTC-a), for all (t, x, µ, ν, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × P2(R
d)2 × Rd,
there exists a unique minimizer αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) of H
(r)
i , where the map [0, T ]×R
d×P2(R
d)2×Rd ∋
(t, x, µ, ν, y) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) ∈ Ai is measurable. There exist constants C depending only on (L, λ)
and C ′ depending additionally on K such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′, y, y′ ∈ Rd, µ, ν ∈ P2(Rd),
|αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y)| ≤ C
′ +C
(
|x|+ |y|+M2(µ) +M2(ν)
)
|αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y)− αˆi(t, x
′, µ, ν, y′)| ≤ C
(
|x− x′|+ |y − y′|
)
.
Moreover, for any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × Rd, the map P2(R
d)2 ∋ (µ, ν) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) is
continuous with respect to W2-distance:
|αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y) − αˆi(t, x, µ
′, ν ′, y)|
≤ (2λ)−1
(
LW2(µ, µ
′) + |bi,2(t, ν)− bi,2(t, ν ′)||y|+ |∂αfi(t, x, µ′, ν, αˆi)− ∂αfi(t, x, µ′, ν ′, αˆi)|
)
where αˆi := αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y).
Proof. It can be shown exactly in the same way as Lemma 3.1.
The control problem (4.1) for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 with a given flow of probability measure
µj ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d)), j 6= i is actually the special case studied in [9] and Section 6.4 in [10]. In fact,
we have removed the control αi dependency from the diffusion coefficient σi.
4 The relevant adjoint
equations for the optimal control problem of MKV-type (4.1) are given by with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i:
dXit = bi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))dt+ σi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t )dW
i
t ,
dY it = −∂xHi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))dt (4.3)
−E˜
[
∂µHi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y˜
i
t , Z˜
i
t , αˆi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y˜
i
t ))(X
i
t )
]
dt+ ZitdW
i
t ,
with Xi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d) and Y iT = ∂xgi(X
i
T ,L(X
i
T ), µ
j
T ) + E˜
[
∂µgi(X˜
i
T ,L(X
i
T ), µ
j
T )(X
i
T )
]
.
Here, (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) denotes a copy of (Ω,F ,P) and every random variable with tilde, such as X˜, denotes
a clone of X on (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜). The expectation under P˜ is denoted by E˜. More explicitly, one can write
(4.3) as
dXit =
(
bi,0(t, µ
j
t ) + bi,1(t, µ
j
t)X
i
t + b¯i,1(t, µ
j
t )E[X
i
t ] + bi,2(t, µ
j
t )αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t )
)
dt
+
(
σi,0(t, µ
j
t) + σi,1(t, µ
j
t )X
i
t + σ¯i,1(t, µ
j
t )E[X
i
t ]
)
dW it ,
dY it = −
(
bi,1(t, µ
j
t )
⊤Y it + σi,1(t, µ
j
t )
⊤Zit + ∂xfi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))
)
dt
−
(
b¯i,1(t, µ
j
t )
⊤
E[Y it ] + σ¯i,1(t, µ
j
t )
⊤
E[Zit ] + E˜
[
∂µfi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , αˆi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y˜
i
t ))(X
i
t)
]
dt
+ZitdW
i
t ,
4It then makes possible to derive the stability relation irrespective of the size of Lipschitz constant for Z.
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which is a C(L, λ)-Lipschitz FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type. Note that due to Lemma 4.1, αˆi is
Lipschitz continuous not only in (Xi, Y i) but also in L(Xi). For each i ∈ {1, 2}, it is important
to notice that the Lipschitz constant is independent of the given flow µj, j 6= i. Since Assumption
(MFTC-a) satisfies every solvability condition used in [9], we have the following results:5
Theorem 4.1. Under Assumption (MFTC-a), the adjoint FBSDE (4.3) of each i ∈ {1, 2} has a
unique solution (Xˆit , Yˆ
i
t , Zˆ
i
t)t∈[0,T ] ∈ S2×S2×H2 for any flow µj ∈ C([0, T ];P2(Rd)) and any initial
condition ξi ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d). If we set αˆi =
(
αˆit = αˆi(t, Xˆ
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Yˆ
i
t )
)
t∈[0,T ], then it gives
the optimal control. In particular, the inequality Jµ
j
i (αˆ
i) + λE
∫ T
0 |β
i
t − αˆ
i
t|
2dt ≤ Jµ
j
i (β
i) holds for
any βi ∈ Ai.
Proof. This is the direct result of Theorem 4.7 (sufficiency) and Theorem 5.1 (unique solvability) by
Carmona & Delarue (2015)[9], where the sufficiency is proved in a parallel way to Theorem 3.1, and
the unique solvability is based on the continuation method developed by Peng & Wu (1999) [30].
Lemma 4.2. Under the same conditions used in Theorem 4.1, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and any ξi ∈
L
2(Ω,Ft,P;R
d), there exists a unique solution, denoted by (Xi,t,ξ
i
s , Y
i,t,ξi
s , Z
i,t,ξi
s )t≤s≤T , of (4.3) on
[t, T ] with Xi,t,ξ
i
t = ξ
i as initial condition. Moreover, for any µ ∈ P2(R
d), there exists a measurable
mapping uµ
j
i (t, ·, µ) : R
d ∋ x 7→ uµ
j
i (t, x, µ) with Y
i,t,ξi
t = u
µj
i (t, ξ
i,L(ξi)) P-a.s. such that, for any
ξi, ξ′,i ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,P;Rd),
E
[
|uµ
j
i (t, ξ
i,L(ξi))− uµ
j
i (t, ξ
′,i,L(ξ′,i))|2
] 1
2 ≤ CE
[
|ξi − ξ′,i|2
] 1
2 , (4.4)
with some constant C depending only on L and λ.
Proof. This is a direct result of Lemma 5.6 in [9]. The Lipschitz constant can be read from the
stability estimate used in the continuation method (Lemma 5.5 in [9]), which is dependent only on
the Lipschitz constant of the FBSDE.
Remark 4.2. . Note that, due to the uniqueness of the solution, we have for any t ∈ [0, T ],
Yˆ it = Y
i,0,ξi
t = Y
i,t,Xˆit
t = u
µj
i (t, Xˆ
i
t ,L(Xˆ
i
t)) P-a.s. Moreover, once again by Lemma 3.3 in [9], for any
µ ∈ P2(R
d), there exists a version Rd ∋ x 7→ uµ
j
i (t, x, µ) in L
2(Rd, µ) that is Lipschitz continuous
with the same Lipschitz constant C used in (4.4) i.e., |uµ
j
i (t, x, µ) − u
µj
i (t, x
′, µ)| ≤ C|x − x′| for
any x, x′ ∈ Rd. In the remainder, we always use this Lipschitz version and often adopt a simpler
notation ui without the superscript µ
j .
Making use of the Lipschitz continuity in Lemma 4.2, we can derive the stability relation.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that the two set of functions (bi, σi, fi, gi) and (b
′
i, σ
′
i, f
′
i , g
′
i) satisfy Assump-
tion (MFTC-a). For given inputs ξi, ξ′,i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;Rd) and µj,µ′,j ∈ C([0, T ];P2(Rd)), let
us denote the corresponding solution to (4.3) by (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ] and (X
′,i
t , Y
′,i
t , Z
′,i
t )t∈[0,T ], respec-
5In [9], A = Rk is assumed. However, there is no difficulty for extending a general closed and convex subset
A ⊂ Rk, which is actually the case studied in Chapter 6 in [10].
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tively. Then, there exists a constant C depending only on (L, λ) such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xit −X
′,i
t |
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y it − Y
′,i
t |
2 +
∫ T
0
|Zit − Z
′,i
t |
2dt
]
≤ CE
{
|ξi − ξ′,i|2 + |∂xgi(XiT ,L(X
i
T ), µ
j
T )− ∂xg
′
i(X
i
T ,L(X
i
T ), µ
′,j
T )|
2
+E˜
[
|∂µgi(X˜
i
T ,L(X
i
T ), µ
j
T )(X
i
T )− ∂µg
′
i(X˜
i
T ,L(X
i
T ), µ
j,′
T )(X
i
T )|
2
]
+
∫ T
0
|bi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))− b
′
i(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
′,j
t , αˆ
′
i(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
′,j
t , Y
i
t ))|
2dt
+
∫ T
0
|σi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t )− σ
′
i(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
′,j
t )|
2dt
+
∫ T
0
(
|∂xHi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y
i
t ))
−∂xH
′
i(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
′,j
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆ
′
i(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
′,j
t , Y
i
t ))|
2
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
E˜
[
|∂µHi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y˜
i
t , Z˜
i
t , αˆi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
j
t , Y˜
i
t ))(X
i
t )
−∂µH
′
i(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
′,j
t , Y˜
i
t , Z˜
i
t , αˆ
′
i(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t), µ
′,j
t , Y˜
i
t ))(X
i
t )|
2
]
dt
}
, (4.5)
where the functions Hi,H
′
i : [0, T ]×R
d×P2(R
d)2 ×Rd×Rd×d ×Ai → R are the Hamiltonians as-
sociated with the coefficients (bi, σi, fi) and (b
′
i, σ
′
i, f
′
i), respectively, and αˆi, αˆ
′
i are their minimizers.
In particular, there is another constant C ′ depending additionally on K such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xit |
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y it |
2 +
∫ T
0
|Zit |
2dt
]
≤ C
(
||ξi||22 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
M2(µ
j
t )
2
)
+ C ′, (4.6)
and, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
|Y it | ≤ C
(
||ξi||2 + |X
i
t |+ sup
s∈[0,T ]
M2(µ
j
s)
)
+ C ′, P-a.s. (4.7)
Proof. It can be proved in the same way as Lemma 3.2. For small T ≤ c, where c is dependent
only on (L, λ), using the inequality W2(L(X),L(Y ))
2 ≤ E|X − Y |2, one can show the stability
relation (4.5) exactly in the same way as in the standard Lipschitz FBSDE of non-MKV type. For
general T , we can connect the short-term estimate by the same technique adopted in the proof of
Lemma 3.2. Here, we make use of the Lipschitz continuity in Lemma 4.2.
As for the growth conditions, we get, by the same arguments used to derive (3.18),
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xit |
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y it |
2 +
∫ T
0
|Zit |
2dt
]
≤ C
(
||ξi||22 + |∂xgi(0, δ0, µ
j
T )|
2 + |∂µgi(0, δ0, µ
j
T )(0)|
2
+
∫ T
0
(
|bi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t , αˆi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t , 0))|
2 + |σi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t )|
2
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
(
|∂xfi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t , αˆi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t , 0))|
2 + |∂µfi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t , αˆi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t , 0))(0)|
2
)
dt
)
,(4.8)
where δ0 denotes the distribution with Dirac mass at the origin. (4.6) now easily follows. Finally,
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since Y it = Y
i,t,Xit
t , we have ||ui(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t))||2 ≤ C
(
||ξi||2 + supt∈[0,T ]M2(µ
j
t)
)
+ C ′ from (4.6).
By the Lipschitz continuity in Remark 4.2 and the estimate in (4.6), we get
|ui(t, 0,L(X
i
t ))| ≤ ||ui(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t))||2 + C||X
i
t ||2 ≤ C
(
||ξi||2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
M2(µ
j
t )
)
+ C ′ .
Using the Lipschitz continuity in Remark 4.2 once again, we get the desired estimate (4.7).
4.3 Nash MFTC equilibrium under additional boundedness
In preceding subsections, we have seen that, for given flows of probability measures µ1,µ2 ∈
C([0, T ];P2(R
d)), the solution to each optimal control problem of (4.1) is characterized by the
uniquely solvable FBSDE (4.3). It follows that finding a solution to a matching problem (4.2) is
equivalent to find a solution to the coupled systems of FBSDEs of MKV-type: for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i,
dXit = bi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), Y
i
t ))dt+ σi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ))dW
i
t ,
dY it = −∂xHi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), Y
i
t , Z
i
t , αˆi(t,X
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), Y
i
t ))dt (4.9)
−E˜
[
∂µHi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), Y˜
i
t , Z˜
i
t , αˆi(t, X˜
i
t ,L(X
i
t),L(X
j
t ), Y˜
i
t ))(X
i
t)
]
dt+ ZitdW
i
t ,
withXi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d) and Y iT = ∂xgi(X
i
T ,L(X
i
T ),L(X
j
T ))+E˜
[
∂µgi(X˜
i
T ,L(X
i
T ),L(X
j
T ))(X
i
T )
]
.
In this subsection, we prove the existence of a solution to the system of FBSDEs (4.9) under
the additional assumption.
Assumption 4.2. (MFTC-b) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, there exists some constant Λ and some point
0Ai ∈ Ai such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and any ν ∈ P2(R
d),
|bi,0(t, ν)|, |σi,0(t, ν)| ≤ Λ,
|∂(x,α)fi(t, 0, δ0, ν, 0Ai)|, |∂xgi(0, δ0, ν)| ≤ Λ,
|∂µfi(t, 0, δ0, ν, 0Ai)(0)|, |∂µgi(0, δ0, ν)(0)| ≤ Λ .
Here is the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 4.2. Under Assumptions (MFTC-a,b), the system of FBSDEs (4.9) (and hence the
matching problem (4.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d).
Proof. We let, with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, (Xi,µ
j
t , Y
i,µj
t , Z
i,µj
t )t∈[0,T ] denote the solution to the FBSDE (4.3)
for a given flow µj ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d)) j 6= i and the initial condition Xi,µ
j
0 = ξ
i. By Theorem 4.1,
we can define a map:
Φ : C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 ∋ (µ1,µ2) 7→
(
L(X1,µ
2
t )t∈[0,T ],L(X
2,µ2
t )t∈[0,T ]
)
∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 .
It is easy to see that the solvability of the system of FBSDEs with McKean-Vlasov type (4.9) is
equivalent to the existence of a fixed point of the map Φ. As in Theorem 3.3, we equip the linear
space C([0, T ];M1f (R
d))2 with the supremum of the Kantorovich-Rubinstein norm (3.20) so that
we can apply Schauder FPT (Theorem 3.2).
We start from studying a priori estimates. By the estimate in (3.6), we get
|αˆi(t, x, µ, ν, y)| ≤ λ
−1(|bi,2(t, ν)||y|+ |∂αfi(t, x, µ, ν, 0Ai)|)+ |0Ai |,
and hence |αˆi(t, 0, δ0, µ
j
t , 0)| ≤ λ
−1Λ + |0Ai | ≤ C(λ,Λ) uniformly in µ
j . The estimate (4.8) then
implies that E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |Y
i,µj
t |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 + ||ξi||22
)
with C independent of µj. From the last part of
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the proof for Lemma 4.3, we get, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
|Y i,µ
j
t | ≤ C
(
1 + ||ξi||2 + |X
i,µj
t |
)
, P-a.s.
and hence |αˆi(t,X
i,µj
t ,L(X
i,µj
t ), µ
j
t , Y
i,µj
t )| ≤ C
(
1 + ||ξi||2 + |X
i,µj
t |+M2(L(X
i,µj
t ))
)
uniformly in
µj. Thus it is straightforward to see that there exists some constant C independent of µj such
that E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,µj
t |
2
]
≤ C and
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,µ
j
t |
4|F0
] 1
2
≤ C
(
1 + |ξi|2
)
, W2(L(X
i,µj
t ),L(X
i,µj
s )) ≤ C|t− s|
1
2 , ∀t, s,∈ [0, T ].
Therefore, just repeating the arguments used in the proof for Theorem 3.3, we can show that Φ is
a self-map on a closed and convex subset E of C([0, T ];M1f (R
d))2,
E :=
{
(µ1,µ2) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2;
∀a ≥ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫
|x|≥a
|x|2µit(dx) ≤ C
(
a−1 + E
[
|ξi|21{|ξi|≥√a}
) 1
2
}
, (4.10)
with some constant C and that Φ(E) is a relatively compact subset of C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2. The
continuity of the map Φ can be shown by Lemma 4.3 just as in Theorem 3.3. Schauder FPT now
guarantees the existence of a fixed point for map Φ, which then establishes the existence of solution
to the system of FBSDEs (4.9).
4.4 Nash MFTC equilibrium for small T or small coupling
Here is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumption (MFTC-a), there exists some positive constant c depending
only on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c, the system of FBSDEs (4.9) (and hence the matching
problem (4.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d).
Proof. As in the proof for Theorem 3.4, we use the push-forward φn ◦µ of the measure µ ∈ P2(R
d)
defined by the map Rd ∋ x 7→
nx
max(M2(µ), n)
. For eacn n ∈ N, we introduce the approximated
coefficient functions by
(bni,0, b
n
i,2, σ
n
i,0)(t, ν) := (bi,0, bi,2, σi,0)(t, φn ◦ ν),
fni (t, x, µ, ν, α) := fi(t, x, µ, φn ◦ ν, α), g
n
i (x, µ, ν) := gi(x, µ, φn ◦ ν) ,
and accordingly define
bni (t, x, µ, ν, α) := b
n
i,0(t, ν) + bi,1(t, ν)x+ b¯i,1(t, ν)µ¯ + b
n
i,2(t, ν)α ,
σni (t, x, µ, ν) := σ
n
i,0(t, ν) + σi,1(t, ν)x+ σ¯i,1(t, ν)µ¯ ,
Hni (t, x, µ, ν, y, z, α) := 〈b
n
i (t, x, µ, ν, α), y〉 + tr[σ
n
i (t, x, µ, ν)
⊤z] + fni (t, x, µ, ν, α) .
It is obvious to see that the approximated coefficients (bni , σ
n
i , f
n
i , g
n
i ) satisfy every condition in
Assumptions (MFTC-a,b). Moreover, the minimizer αˆni of H
n
i is given by
αˆni (t, x, µ, ν, y) = αˆi(t, x, µ, φn ◦ ν, y) ,
22
where αˆi is the minimizer of the original Hamiltonian. The regularization for bi,2 is done solely
to obtain the simple expression for αˆni as above. By Theorem 4.2, for eacn n ∈ N, there exists
a solution (Xi,nt , Y
i,n
t , Z
i,n
t )t∈[0,T ], 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 to the system of FBSDEs (4.9) with the approxi-
mated coefficient functions (bni , σ
n
i , f
n
i , g
n
i )1≤i≤2. By the estimate (4.7), there exist constants C
depending only on (L, λ) and C ′ depending additionally on K such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
|Y i,nt | ≤ C
(
||ξi||2 + |X
i,n
t | + sups∈[0,T ]M2(L(X
j,n
s ))
)
+ C ′, P-a.s. uniformly in n. Lemma 4.1
then implies that αˆni (t) := αˆ
n
i (t,X
i,n
t ,L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
j,n
t ), Y
i,n
t ) satisfies |αˆ
n
i (t)| ≤ C
(
||ξi||2 + |X
i,n
t |+
M2(L(X
i,n
t )) + sups∈[0,T ]M2(L(X
j,n
s ))
)
+ C ′. Thus, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ CE
[
|ξi|2 +
∫ t
0
[
|bni (s,X
i,n
s ,L(X
i,n
s ),L(X
j,n
s ), αˆ
n
i (s))|
2
+|σni (s,X
i,n
s ,L(X
i,n
s ),L(X
j,n
s ))|
2
]
ds
]
≤ C
(
||ξi||22 + T sup
s∈[0,T ]
M2(L(X
j,n
s ))
2 +
∫ t
0
2∑
j=1
E[|Xj,ns |
2]ds
)
+ C ′. (4.11)
Hence Gronwall’s inequality gives
∑2
i=1 supt∈[0,T ] E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ C ′+CT
∑2
i=1 supt∈[0,T ]M2(L(X
i,n
t ))
2,
where C ′ now depends also on ||ξ||2. Therefore there exists some constant c depending only on
(L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c,
2∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ C(L, λ,K, ||ξ||2) (4.12)
uniformly in n. For such T ≤ c, using the estimate (4.12), we get by the standard technique that
W2(L(X
i,n
t ),L(X
i,n
s )) ≤ C(L, λ,K, ||ξ||2)|t− s|
1
2 ,
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,nt |
4|F0
] 1
2
≤ C(L, λ,K, ||ξ||2)
(
1 + |ξi|2
)
,
uniformly in n. We thus see that (L(X1,nt )t∈[0,T ],L(X
2,n
t )t∈[0,T ])n≥1 is a relatively compact subset of
C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2. Upon extracting some subsequence, there exist µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d)) such
that limn→∞ supt∈[0,T ]W2(L(X
i,n
t ), µ
i
t) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2. By letting (X
i
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ],1≤i≤2 denote
the solution to the FBSDE (4.3) with the flows (µ1,µ2), we can prove that (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ],1≤i≤2
is actually a solution to (4.9) by the stability estimate in Lemma 4.3 and the same arguments used
in the proof for Theorem 3.4.
As in Section 3, it is possible to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium for a given T with
quadratic cost functions by making the coupling between FSDE and BSDE small enough.
Theorem 4.4. Under Assumption (MFTC-a) and a given T , the system of FBSDEs (4.9) (and
hence he matching problem (4.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d) if λ−1||bi,2||∞, 1 ≤
i ≤ 2 are small enough.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.5, the term involving supt∈[0,T ]M2(L(X
j,n
s ))2 in (4.11) is
proportional to λ−1||bi,2||∞. Hence, if we make this factor small enough, we obtains the estimate
(4.12) for a given T . The remaining arguments are the same as in the proof for Theorem 4.3.
23
Remark 4.3. There is no difficulty to generalize all the analyses in Section 4 for handling any
finite number of populations 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
5 Games among Cooperative and non-Cooperative Populations
As a natural extension of Sections 3 and 4, we now study a Nash equilibrium with two populations,
where the agents in the first population (P-1) cooperate by adopting the same feedback strategy
while each agent in the second population (P-2) competes with every other agent. As before, we
assume that the agents in each population share the same cost functions as well as the coefficient
functions of their state dynamics. Let us call the large population limit of this problem as Nash
MFTC-MFG Problem.
One of the motives to study this problem is to treat a situation, for example, where a large
number of oil producers are competing to maximize their profits while a part of them are members
of a certain association, such as OPEC, cooperating within the group to maintain a favorable level
of oil price. Since the analysis can be generalized to any finite number of populations, it may have
a wide scope of application.
5.1 Definition of Nash MFTC-MFG problem
We formulate the problem in the following way.
(i) Fix any two deterministic flows of probability measures (µi = (µit)t∈[0,T ])i∈{1,2} given on Rd.
(ii) Solve the two optimal control problems
inf
α1∈A1
J
µ2
1 (α
1), inf
α2∈A2
J
µ2,µ1
2 (α2) (5.1)
over some admissible strategies Ai (i ∈ {1, 2}), where
J
µ2
1 (α
1) := E
[∫ T
0
f1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , α
1
t )dt+ g1(X
1
T ,L(X
1
T ), µ
2
T )
]
,
J
µ2,µ1
2 (α
2) := E
[∫ T
0
f2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , α
2
t )dt+ g2(X
2
T , µ
2
T , µ
1
T )
]
,
subject to the dynamic constraints
dX1t = b1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , α
1
t )dt+ σ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t )dW
1
t ,
dX2t = b2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , α
2
t )dt+ σ2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t )dW
2
t ,
for t ∈ [0, T ] with
(
Xi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d)
)
1≤i≤2. Notice that the first control problem is
of McKean-Vlasov type which represents the large population limit of cooperative agents. For
each population i ∈ {1, 2}, we suppose that Ai is the set of Ai-valued F
i-progressively measurable
processes αi satisfying E
∫ T
0 |α
i
t|
2dt <∞ and Ai ⊂ R
k is closed and convex, as before.
(iii) Find a pair of probability flows (µ1,µ2) as a solution to the matching problem:
∀t ∈ [0, T ], µ1t = L(Xˆ
1,µ2
t ), µ
2
t = L(Xˆ
2,µ2,µ1
t ) , (5.2)
where (Xˆ1,µ
2
) and (Xˆ2,µ
2,µ1) are the solutions to the optimal control problems in (ii).
Throughout Section 5, the major assumptions for the coefficients (b1, σ1, f1, g1) of the first
population (P-1) are given by (MFTC-a), and those for the coefficients (b2, σ2, f2, g2) of the
24
second population (P-2) are given by (MFG-a). We have already learned from Theorems 3.1 and
4.1 that the solution to each of the optimal control problems in (5.1) for given deterministic flows
µ1,µ2 ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d)) is characterized by the uniquely solvable FBSDEs,
dX1t = b1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , αˆ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , Y
1
t ))dt + σ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t )dW
1
t ,
dY 1t = −∂xH1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , Y
1
t , Z
1
t , αˆ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , Y
1
t ))dt
−E˜
[
∂µH1(t, X˜
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , Y˜
1
t , Z˜
1
t , αˆ1(t, X˜
1
t ,L(X
1
t ), µ
2
t , Y˜
1
t ))(X
1
t )
]
dt+ Z1t dW
1
t , (5.3)
with X10 = ξ
1 and Y 1T = ∂xg1(t,X
1
T ,L(X
1
T ), µ
2
T ) + E˜
[
∂µg1(X˜
1
T ,L(X
1
T ), µ
2
T )(X
1
T )
]
, and
dX2t = b2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , αˆ2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , Y
2
t ))dt + σ2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t )dW
2
t ,
dY 2t = −∂xH2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , Y
2
t , Z
2
t , αˆ2(t,X
2
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , Y
2
t ))dt+ Z
2
t dW
2
t , (5.4)
withX20 = ξ
2 and Y 2T = ∂xg2(X
2
T , µ
2
T , µ
1
T ), respectively. Here, the Hamiltonian Hi and its minimizer
αˆi are defined as before using the corresponding coefficients (bi, σi, fi).
5.2 MFTC-MFG equilibrium under additional boundedness
In order to establish the existence of an equilibrium (5.2), we have to show the existence of a
solution to the following coupled system of FBSDEs:
dX1t = b1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ),L(X
2
t ), αˆ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ),L(X
2
t ), Y
1
t ))dt+ σ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ),L(X
2
t ))dW
1
t ,
dY 1t = −∂xH1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ),L(X
2
t ), Y
1
t , Z
1
t , αˆ1(t,X
1
t ,L(X
1
t ),L(X
2
t ), Y
1
t ))dt
−E˜
[
∂µH1(t, X˜
1
t ,L(X
1
t ),L(X
2
t ), Y˜
1
t , Z˜
1
t , αˆ1(t, X˜
1
t ,L(X
1
t ),L(X
2
t ), Y˜
1
t ))(X
1
t )
]
dt+ Z1t dW
1
t ,
with X10 = ξ
1 and Y 1T = ∂xg1(t,X
1
T ,L(X
1
T ),L(X
2
T )) + E˜
[
∂µg1(X˜
1
T ,L(X
1
T ),L(X
2
T ))(X
1
T )
]
, and
dX2t = b2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ),L(X
1
t ), αˆ2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ),L(X
1
t ), Y
2
t ))dt+ σ2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ),L(X
1
t ))dW
2
t ,
dY 2t = −∂xH2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ),L(X
1
t ), Y
2
t , Z
2
t , αˆ2(t,X
2
t ,L(X
2
t ),L(X
1
t ), Y
2
t ))dt+ Z
2
t dW
2
t , (5.5)
with X20 = ξ
2 and Y 2T = ∂xg2(X
2
T ,L(X
2
T ),L(X
1
T )).
In this section, our goal is to prove the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumptions (MFTC-a,b) for the coefficients (b1, σ1, f1, g1) and Assump-
tions (MFG-a,b) for the coefficients (b2, σ2, f2, g2), the system of FBSDEs (5.5) (and hence the
matching problem (5.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d).
Proof. We let (X1,µ
2
t , Y
1,µ2
t , Z
1,µ2
t )t∈[0,T ] and (X
2,µ2,µ1
t , Y
2,µ2,µ1
t , Z
2,µ2,µ1
t )t∈[0,T ] denote the solu-
tions to the FBSDE (5.3) and (5.4) respectively for given flows of probability measures (µ1,µ2).
By defining the map Φ as
Φ : C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 ∋ (µ1,µ2) 7→
(
L(X1,µ
2
t )t∈[0,T ],L(X
2,µ2,µ1
t )t∈[0,T ]
)
∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 , (5.6)
the claim is proved once we find a fixed point of the map Φ.
It is the direct result of Theorem 4.2 for (P-1) and Theorem 3.3 for (P-2) that there exists a
constant C independent of µ1 and µ2 such that, for any t, s ∈ [0, T ],
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X1,µ
2
t |
4|F0
] 1
2 ≤ C
(
1 + |ξ1|2
)
, E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X2,µ
2,µ1
t |
4|F0
] 1
2 ≤ C
(
1 + |ξ2|2
)
,
W2(L(X
1,µ2
t ),L(X
1,µ2
s )) ≤ C|t− s|
1
2 , W2(L(X
2,µ2,µ1
t ),L(X
2,µ2,µ1
s )) ≤ C|t− s|
1
2 . (5.7)
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Thus we can show that, for the same form of closed and convex subset E of C([0, T ];M1f (R
d))2 in
(4.10) with sufficiently large C, that Φ maps E into itself and also that Φ(E) is a relatively compact
subset of C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2. The continuity of the map Φ can be shown by Lemmas 4.3 and 3.2
just as in Theorems 4.2 and 3.3. By Schauder FPT, the claim is proved.
5.3 MFTC-MFG equilibrium for small T or small coupling
We now give the main result of Section 5.
Theorem 5.2. Under Assumption (MFTC-a) for the coefficients (b1, σ1, f1, g1) and Assumption
(MFG-a) for the coefficients (b2, σ2, f2, g2), there exists some positive constant c depending only
on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c, the system of FBSDEs (5.5) (and hence matching problem (5.2))
is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d).
Proof. Let us introduce the approximated functions (bn1 , σ
n
1 , f
n
1 , g
n
1 )n≥1 as in Theorem 4.3 and also
(bn2 , σ
n
2 , f
n
2 , g
n
2 )n≥1 as in Theorem 3.4, which satisfy Assumptions (MFTC-a,b) and Assumptions
(MFG-a,b) for each n, respectively. Theorem 5.1 then guarantees that there exists a solution to
the system of FBSDEs (5.5) with the approximated functions (bni , σ
n
i , f
n
i , g
n
i )1≤i≤2 for each n. We
let (Xi,nt , Y
i,n
t , Z
i,n
t )t∈[0,T ], 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 denote the corresponding solution.
Since inequalities (4.11) and (3.25) still hold, we can show that there exist constants C depending
only on (L, λ) and C ′ depending additionally on K such that,
E
[
|X1,nt |
2
]
≤ C
(
||ξ1||22 + T sup
s∈[0,T ]
M2(L(X
2,n
s ))
2 +
∫ t
0
E
2∑
i=1
[
|Xi,ns |
2
]
ds
)
+ C ′ ,
E
[
|X2,nt |
2
]
≤ C
(
||ξ2||22 + T sup
s∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
M2(L(X
i,n
s ))
2 +
∫ t
0
2∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi,ns |
2
]
ds
)
+ C ′ .
Hence we get, by Gronwall’s inequality, that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ C
(
||ξ||22 + T sup
s∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
M2(L(X
i,n
s ))
2
)
+C ′.
Therefore there exists a positive constant c depending only on (L, λ) such that, for any T ≤ c,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi,nt |
2
]
≤ C ′
(
1 + ||ξ||22
)
.
Using the linear growth property of αˆni in |X
i,n
t |, we can show that (L(X
1,n
t )t∈[0,T ],L(X
2,n
t )t∈[0,T ])n≥1
is a relatively compact subset of C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2. The remaining arguments proceed in exactly
the same way as in the proofs for Theorems 4.3 and 3.4.
Theorem 5.3. Under Assumption (MFTC-a) for the coefficients (b1, σ1, f1, g1) and Assumption
(MFG-a) for the coefficients (b2, σ2, f2, g2) and a given T , the system of FBSDEs (5.5) (and hence
matching problem (5.2)) is solvable for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,F0,P;R
d) if λ−1||bi,2||∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 are
small enough.
Proof. The claim can be proved in a completely parallel way to Theorems 3.5 and 4.4.
Remark 5.1. As in Sections 3 and 4, the analysis can be easily extended for the situation with
any finite number of cooperative and non-cooperative populations.
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6 Approximate Equilibrium for MFG with Finite Agents
In the remaining sections, we investigate quantitative relationships between the solutions to the
mean field games obtained in the previous three sections and those to their associated games with
finite number of agents. We make use of the techniques developed in [34, 4, 6, 8, 9] and in particular
Chapter 6 in [11] with appropriate generalizations to fit our situation. First, in this section, we
shall study the finite agent problem associated with the multi-population mean field game solved
in Section 3. Throughout the section, we assume that the conditions used either in Theorem 3.4 or
Theorem 3.5 are satisfied. We let (µ1,µ2) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 denote a solution to the matching
problem (3.2).
6.1 Convergence of approximate optimal controls
For each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we suppose that there are Ni agents who are labeled by p. Let us
first introduce Ni independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) copies of the state process in the
mean field setup:
dX
i,p
t = bi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t )dW
i,p
t , (6.1)
for 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni, j 6= i, t ∈ [0, T ] with X
i,p
0 = ξ
i,p, and
αˆ
i,p
t := αˆi(t,X
i
t, µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t,X
i
t))
for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Here, (ξi,p)1≤p≤Ni is the set of i.i.d random variables with L(ξ
i,p) = µi0, and
(W i,p = (W i,pt )t∈[0,T ])1≤p≤Ni are independent standard Brownian motions, which are also indepen-
dent from (ξi,p)1≤p≤Ni . Moreover, they are assumed to be independent from those in the other
population. In other words, all of the set (ξi,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni,1≤i≤2 are assumed to be independent.
ui is the decoupling field given in Theorem 3.1 associated with the equilibrium flows of probability
measures (µi,µj). αˆi is the minimizer of the Hamiltonian for the population i defined in (3.4). By
construction, (Xi,p)1≤p≤Ni are i.i.d. processes satisfying L(X
i,p
t ) = µ
i
t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. We denote the
empirical distribution for (X i,p)1≤p≤Ni by
µi
t
:=
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
δ
Xi,pt
.
In the remainder, the complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) is enlarged accordingly to support
(ξi,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni,1≤i≤2 and the filtration F is assumed to be generated by (ξ
i,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni,1≤i≤2
with complete and right-continuous augmentation.
Lemma 6.1. Suppose that the conditions either for Theorem 3.4 or Theorem 3.5 are satisfied.
Then, for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, there exists some sequence (ǫNi)Ni≥1 that tends to 0 as Ni
tends to ∞ and some constant C such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
≤ Cǫ2Ni .
Furthermore, when µi0 ∈ Pr(R
d) with r > 4, we have an explicit estimate
ǫ2Ni = N
−2/max(d,4)
i (1 + ln(Ni)1d=4) .
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Proof. When µi0 ∈ Pr(R
d), ∀r ≥ 2, it is standard to check
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Mr(µ
i
r)
r ≤ E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X i,pt |
r
]
≤ C
(
1 +Mr(µ
i
0)
r
)
with some C independent of Ni thanks to the linear growth of the coefficients in (6.1). Then, the
last claim is the direct result of Theorem 5.8 and Remark 5.9 in [10].
As for the first claim, (5.19) in [10] implies
lim
Ni→∞
E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
= 0 (6.2)
for each t. In order to prove the uniform convergence in t 6, it suffices to show that there exists a
compact set K ⊂ C([0, T ];R) such that(
E[W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2]t∈[0,T ]
)
Ni≥1
⊂ K .
In fact, if this is the case, every subsequence has a uniformly convergent subsequence, all of which
converge to 0 due to the pointwise convergence in (6.2). Hence, the whole sequence must uniformly
converges to 0. The boundedness can be checked by
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
≤ 2 sup
t∈[0,T ]
( 1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
E[|X i,pt |
2] +M2(µ
i
t)
2
)
≤ 4 sup
t∈[0,T ]
M2(µ
i
t)
2 ≤ C .
Moreover, for any 0 ≤ t, s ≤ T ,∣∣∣E[W2(µit, µit)2]− E[W2(µis, µis)2]
∣∣∣ ≤ CE[(W2(µit, µit)−W2(µis, µis))2] 12
≤ C
(
E[W2(µ
i
t
, µi
s
)2] +W2(µ
i
t, µ
i
s)
2
) 1
2
≤ CE
[
|X i,pt −X
i,p
s |
2
] 1
2 ≤ C|t− s|
1
2 ,
which implies the equicontinuity. Arzela-Ascoli theorem guarantees the desired compactness.
Assumption 6.1. (MFG-FA) On top of Assumption (MFG-a), either T or (λ−1||bi,2||∞)1≤i≤2
is small enough to satisfy the conditions for Theorem 3.4 or Theorem 3.5. Moreover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
(A1) There exists some constant K such that
|(bi,0, σi,0)(t, µ
′, ν ′)− (bi,0, σi,0)(t, µ, ν)| ≤ K
(
W2(µ
′, µ) +W2(ν ′, ν)
)
for any t ∈ [0, T ], µ′, µ, ν ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd), and bi,1, bi,2 as well as σi,1 are independent of the measure
arguments.
(A2) fi and gi are local Lipschitz continuous with respect to the measure arguments i.e., there
exists some constant K for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, µ′, µ, ν ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd) and α ∈ Ai, such that, 7
|(fi, gi)(t, x, µ
′, ν ′, α) − (fi, gi)(t, x, µ, ν, α)|
≤ K
(
1 + |x|+M2(µ
′) +M2(µ) +M2(ν ′) +M2(ν) + |α|
)(
W2(µ
′, µ) +W2(ν ′, ν)
)
.
6See the arguments leading to the estimate (2.15) in the proof of Theorem 2.12 in [11].
7Although there is no (t, α) dependence in gi, we slightly abuse the notation to save the space. Note that the
local Lipschitz property for the arguments (x, α) follows from (MFG-a).
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For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j 6= i, 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni, let us consider the following state dynamics.
dX
i,p
t = bi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t)dW
i,p
t , (6.3)
for t ∈ [0, T ] with Xi,p0 = ξ
i,p. Here, µit :=
1
Ni
∑Ni
p=1 δXi,pt
is the empirical distribution and
αˆ
i,p
t := αˆi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t,X
i,p
t )) .
Since we haveW2(µ
i
t, µ
′,i
t )
2 ≤ 1Ni
∑Ni
p=1 |X
i,p
t −X
′,i,p
t |
2, Assumption (MFG-FA) (A1), the Lipschitz
continuity of αˆi and that of the decoupling field ui make (6.3) an (N1 +N2)-dimensional standard
Lipschitz SDE. (Xi,p)1≤i≤2,1≤p≤Ni correspond to the state processes of the agents who adopt the
feedback control function [0, T ] × Rd ∋ (t, x) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t, x)). The cost functional for the
agent p in the ith population is given by
J
Ni,Nj ,p
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj)) := E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ gi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
.
On the other hand, the optimal cost functional for the mean field game in Section 3 is
J
p
i := E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ gi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
.
Lemma 6.2. Under Assumption (MFG-FA), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, Ni ∈ N, 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni, there exists
some constant C independent of (Ni)
2
i=1 such that,
|J
Ni,Nj ,p
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))− Jpi | ≤ C
2∑
j=1
ǫNj ,
where ǫNj is the one given in Lemma 6.1.
Proof. It suffices to check the case with (p = 1). By Lipschitz continuity and the triangle inequality,
we have E
[
sups∈[0,t] |X
i,1
s −X
i,1
s |
2
]
≤ C
∫ t
0 E
[
|Xi,1s −X
i,1
s |
2+
∑2
i=1W2(µ
i
t, µ
i
t
)2+
∑2
i=1W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
ds.
Applying Gronwall’s inequality after summing over 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we get
2∑
i=1
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,1t −X
i,1
t |
2
]
≤ C
2∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
≤ C
2∑
i=1
ǫ2Ni .
Hence the triangle inequality implies that supt∈[0,T ] E
[
W2(µ
i
t, µ
i
t)
2
]
≤ C
∑2
j=1 ǫ
2
Nj
. We also see
E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,1
t |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 + E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,1
t |
2
])
≤ C. Using local Lipschitz continuity, it is
straightforward to conclude
|J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))− J1i | ≤ C
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|Xi,1t |
2 + |Xi,1t |
2 +
2∑
j=1
M2(µ
j
t)
2
] 1
2
)
× sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|Xi,1t −X
i,1
t |
2 +
2∑
j=1
W2(µ
j
t , µ
j
t )
2
] 1
2
≤ C
2∑
j=1
ǫNj .
Remark 6.1. From the above analysis, we see that (MFG-FA) (A2) is unnecessary if we only
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need the convergence J
Ni,Nj ,p
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))→ Jpi when N1, N2 →∞. (A2) is just used to derive
the explicit order of convergence in terms of (ǫNi)
2
i=1.
6.2 Approximate Nash Equilibrium
In order to investigate an approximate Nash equilibrium, we suppose that one agent deviates from
the feedback control function [0, T ] × Rd ∋ (t, x) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t, x)). By symmetry, we may
assume that this is the first agent in the ith population. The state dynamics of the agents is now
given by, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j 6= i, 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni,
dU
i,p
t = bi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t)dW
i,p
t ,
for t ∈ [0, T ] with U i,p0 = ξ
i,p. βi,1 ∈ H2 is any Ai-valued F-progressively measurable process, and
β
i,p
t := αˆi(t, U
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t, U
i,p
t )), 2 ≤ p ≤ Ni ,
β
j,q
t := αˆj(t, U
j,q
t , µ
j
t , µ
i
t, uj(t, U
j,q
t )), 1 ≤ q ≤ Nj . (6.4)
νit :=
1
Ni
∑Ni
p=1 δU i,pt
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 is the empirical distribution. This is an (N1 + N2)-dimensional
Lipschitz SDE and hence well-defined. The cost functional associated with the deviating agent is
given by
J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (β
i,1, αˆi,(Ni)
−1
, αˆj,(Nj)) := E
[∫ T
0
fi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,1
t )dt+ gi(U
i,1
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )
]
.
Remark 6.2. As we can see from the above definition of control strategies, we shall focus on
the approximate Nash equilibrium in the sense of the closed loop framework. The analysis for the
open loop framework can be done in almost the same (actually slightly simpler) manner, which just
requires to replace the feedback forms in (6.4) by
β
i,p
t = αˆ
i,p
t , 2 ≤ p ≤ Ni, β
j,q
t = αˆ
j,q
t , 1 ≤ q ≤ Nj .
Here is the main result of this section.
Theorem 6.1. Under Assumption (MFG-FA) with sufficiently large (Ni)
2
i=1, the feedback control
functions
(
[0, T ]×Rd ∋ (t, x) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t, x))
)
1≤i,j≤2,j 6=i form an (
∑2
j=1 εNj )-approximate
Nash equilibrium i.e., there exists some constant C independent of (Ni)
2
i=1 such that
J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (β
i,1, αˆi,(Ni)
−1
, αˆj,(Nj)) ≥ J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))− C
2∑
j=1
εNj
for any Ai-valued F-progressively measurable processe β
i,1 ∈ H2, where
(
εNj := max(ǫNj , N
− 1
2
j )
)
1≤j≤2.
Proof. (first step) Let us introduce another dynamics
dU
i,1
t = bi(t, U
i,1
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , β
i,1
t )dt+ σi(t, U
i,1
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t )dW
i,1
t
for t ∈ [0, T ] with U i,10 = ξ
i,1. It is immediate to see that the following estimate holds:
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U
i,1
t |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 + ||βi,1||2
H2
)
. (6.5)
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The associated cost functional
J
1
i (β
i,1) := E
[∫ T
0
fi(t, U
i,1
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , β
i,1
t )dt+ gi(U
i,1
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
satisfies, by Theorem 3.1, an inequality
J
1
i (β
i,1) ≥ J1i + λE
∫ T
0
|βi,1t − αˆ
i,1
t |
2dt . (6.6)
(second step) By the linear growth property of the coefficients, we get
E
[
|U i,pt |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 +
∫ t
0
E
[
|U i,ps |
2 +
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
|U i,ps |
2 +
1
Nj
Nj∑
q=1
|U j,qs |
2 + 1{p=1}|βi,1s |
2
]
ds
)
,
E
[
|U j,qt |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 +
∫ t
0
E
[
|U j,qs |
2 +
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
|U i,ps |
2 +
1
Nj
Nj∑
q=1
|U j,qs |
2
]
ds
)
,
Taking the average and the applying Gronwall’s inequality, we get
sup
t∈[0,T ]
( 1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
E[|U i,pt |
2] +
1
Nj
Nj∑
q=1
E[|U j,qt |
2
])
≤ C
(
1 +
1
Ni
||βi,1||2
H2
)
. (6.7)
Using the above estimate and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy (BDG) inequality, we get
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U i,pt |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 +
( 1
Ni
+ 1{p=1}
)
||βi,1||2
H2
)
, (6.8)
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U j,qt |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 +
1
Ni
||βi,1||2
H2
)
.
By similar calculation, we see
E
[
|U i,pt −X
i,p
t |
2
]
≤ CE
∫ t
0
E
[
|U i,ps −X
i,p
s |
2 +
2∑
j=1
W2(ν
j
s, µ
j
s)
2 + 1{p=1}|βi,1s − αˆ
i,1
s |
2
]
ds .
Combining the same estimate for the jth population, we get from Gronwall’s inequality that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
( 1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
E
[
|U i,pt −X
i,p
t |
2
]
+
1
Nj
Nj∑
p=1
E
[
|U j,qt −X
j,q
t |
2
])
≤ C
( 2∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E[W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2] +
1
Ni
E
∫ T
0
|βi,1t − αˆ
i,1
t |
2dt
)
≤ C
(
(1 + ||βi,1||2
H2
)ε2Ni + ε
2
Nj
)
.
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Here, we have used ||αˆi,1||2
H2
≤ C and the result of Lemma 6.1. By the triangle inequality,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
E
[
W2(ν
i
t, µ
i
t)
2
]
≤ 2 sup
t∈[0,T ]
2∑
i=1
(
E
[
W2(ν
i
t, µ
i
t
)2
]
+ E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
])
≤ C
(
(1 + ||βi,1||2
H2
)ε2Ni + ε
2
Nj
)
(6.9)
holds. Similarly, we have
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|U i,1s − U
i,1
s |
2
]
≤ CE
∫ t
0
[
|U i,1s − U
i,1
s |
2 +W2(ν
i
s, µ
i
s)
2 +W2(ν
j
s, µ
j
s)
2
]
ds
and hence from (6.9) we get
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U i,1t − U
i,1
t |
2
] 1
2 ≤ C
(
(1 + ||βi,1||H2)εNi + εNj
)
. (6.10)
(third step) Finally, we get from the local Lipschitz continuity of the cost functions,
|J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (β
i,1, αˆi,(Ni)
−1
, αˆj,(Nj))− J
1
i (β
i,1)|
=
∣∣∣E[∫ T
0
(
fi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,1
t )− fi(t, U
i,1
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , β
i,1
t )
)
dt+ gi(U
i,1
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )− gi(U
i,1
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]∣∣∣
≤ C
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,1t |
2 + |U
i,1
t |
2 +M2(ν
i
t)
2 +M2(ν
j
t)
2
] 1
2
+ ||βi,1||H2
)
×
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,1t − U
i,1
t |
2
] 1
2 +
2∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(ν
i
t, µ
i
t)
2
] 1
2
)
.
From (6.5), (6.7), (6.8), (6.9) and (6.10), we get
|J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (β
i,1, αˆi,(Ni)
−1
, αˆj,(Nj))− J
1
i (β
i,1)|
≤ C
(
1 + ||βi,1||H2
)(
(1 + ||βi,1||H2)εNi + εNj
)
.
By the estimate in Lemma 6.2, (6.6) and the fact that ||αˆi,1||2
H
≤ C, we see
J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (β
i,1, αˆi,(Ni)
−1
, αˆj,(Nj))− J
Ni,Nj ,1
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))
≥ λ||βi,1 − αˆi,1||2
H2
− C
(
1 + ||βi,1||H2
)(
(1 + ||βi,1||H2)εNi + εNj
)
≥ (λ− C
2∑
j=1
εNj )||β
i,1 − αˆi,1||2
H2
− C
2∑
j=1
εNj .
For large N1 and N2 with C
∑2
j=1 εNj ≤ λ, we get the desired result.
Remark 6.3. The above analysis can be generalized straightforwardly to the setup with any finite
number of populations, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
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7 Approximate Equilibrium for MFTC with Finite Agents
In this section, we shall show how the solution to the Nash MFTC problem studied in Section 4 can
provide an approximate Nash equilibrium among the two competing populations of finite agents
who are cooperative within each population. In the last section dealing with the non-cooperative
agents, the effect to the interactions from the agent deviating from the optimal strategy was shown
to vanish in the large population limit. This does not happen in the current case, because all
the agents in one population adopt the common strategy different from the optimal one. We
shall see that this feature requires us more stringent assumptions to obtain an approximate Nash
equilibrium.
Throughout the section, we assume that the conditions used either in Theorem 4.3 or Theo-
rem 4.4 are satisfied. We let (µ1,µ2) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 denote a solution to the matching problem
(4.2). Moreover, unless otherwise stated, we use the same notation in the last section.
7.1 Convergence of approximate optimal controls
For each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we first consider (Ni) i.i.d. copies of the sate process in the mean
field setup
dX
i,p
t = bi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t)dW
i,p
t ,
for 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni, j 6= i, t ∈ [0, T ] with X
i,p
0 = ξ
i,p, and
αˆ
i,p
t := αˆi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t)) ,
where ui is the function defined in Lemma 4.2 associated with the equilibrium flows of probability
measures (µi,µj). As in the last section, (ξi,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni,1≤i≤2 are assumed to be independent
with L(ξi,p) = µi0. By construction, (X
i,p)1≤p≤Ni are i.i.d. processes satisfying L(X
i,p
t ) = µ
i
t,
∀t ∈ [0, T ]. µi
t
denotes the empirical distribution of (X i,pt )1≤p≤Ni .
Lemma 7.1. Suppose that the conditions either for Theorem 4.3 or Theorem 4.4 are satisfied.
Then, for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, there exists some sequence (ǫNi)Ni≥1 that tends to 0 as Ni
tends to ∞ and some constant C such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
≤ Cǫ2Ni .
Furthermore, when µi0 ∈ Pr(R
d) with r > 4, we have an explicit estimate
ǫ2Ni = N
−2/max(d,4)
i (1 + ln(Ni)1d=4) .
Proof. It can be proved in the same way as Lemma 6.1.
Let us introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption 7.1. (MFTC-FA-a) On top of Assumption (MFTC-a), either T or (λ−1||bi,2||∞)1≤i≤2
is small enough to satisfy the conditions for Theorem 4.3 or Theorem 4.4. Moreover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2,
(A1) There exists some constant K such that
|(bi,0, σi,0)(t, ν
′)− (bi,0, σi,0)(t, ν)| ≤ KW2(ν ′, ν)
for any t ∈ [0, T ], ν ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd), and bi,1, b¯i,1, bi,2, σi,1 as well as σ¯i,1 are independent of the measure
argument.
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(A2) fi and gi are local Lipschitz continuous with respect to the second measure argument i.e.,
there exists some constant K for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd, µ, ν ′, ν ∈ P2(Rd) and α ∈ Ai, such that
|(fi, gi)(t, x, µ, ν
′, α) − (fi, gi)(t, x, µ, ν, α)|
≤ K
(
1 + |x|+M2(µ) +M2(ν
′) +M2(ν) + |α|
)
W2(ν
′, ν) .
Assumption 7.2. (MFTC-FA-b) On top of Assumption (MFTC-FA-a), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, bi,0
and σi,0 are independent of the measure argument.
Remark 7.1. Assumption (MFTC-FA-b) will be used in the last part where we prove the property
of the approximate Nash equilibrium. Under this stringent assumption, the mutual interactions
among the agents belonging to the different populations are induced only through the cost functions
and can appear only in their control strategies.
As in the last section, we introduce for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j 6= i, 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni the state dynamics
dX
i,p
t = bi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t)dW
i,p
t ,
for t ∈ [0, T ] with Xi,p0 = ξ
i,p. Here, µit :=
1
Ni
∑Ni
p=1 δXi,pt
and
αˆ
i,p
t := αˆi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t)) .
Under Assumption (MFTC-FA-a), it is an (N1 + N2)-dimensional Lipschitz SDE and hence is
well-defined. This corresponds to the situation where all the agents in each population adopt the
common feedback control given by the solution to the problem in Section 4. Let us write the cost
functional for the agent in the ith population as
J
Ni,Nj
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj)) := E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ gi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
.
The corresponding cost functional in the mean field problem is given by
Ji := E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ gi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
.
where 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni is arbitrary in both cases. With the word cooperative, we mean that the agents
use the common feedback control function. Hence, even when we consider general strategy later,
all the cost functionals among the agents within each population are the same.
Lemma 7.2. Under Assumption (MFTC-FA-a), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, Ni ∈ N, there exists some
constant C independent of (Ni)
2
i=1 such that,
|J
Ni,Nj
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))− Ji| ≤ C
2∑
j=1
ǫNj ,
where ǫNj is the one given in Lemma 7.1.
Proof. It is straightforward to get the estimate
2∑
i=1
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,pt −X
i,p
t |
2
]
≤ C
2∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t, µ
i
t)
2
]
≤ C
2∑
i=1
ǫ2Ni ,
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and E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,p
t |
2
]
+ E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,p
t |
2
]
≤ C. Using the local Lipschitz continuity for fi and
gi, we can prove the convergence of the cost functional exactly in the same way as in Lemma 6.2.
7.2 Approximate Nash Equilibrium
We now consider the general state dynamics for the agents 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j 6= i, 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni,
dU
i,p
t = bi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t )dW
i,p
t
with t ∈ [0, T ], U i,p0 = ξ
i,p and βi,p ∈ H2 is an Ai-valued F-progressively measurable process.
Since we suppose that the agents are cooperative within each population, we force the set of
strategies (βi,p)1≤p≤Ni to satisfy the condition so that (ξ
i,p,βi,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni is exchangeable i.e.
the distribution is invariant under the permutation with p. As before νit :=
1
Ni
∑Ni
p=1 δU i,pt
denotes
the empirical distribution. The associated cost functional for the ith population is now given by,
with any 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni,
J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni),βj,(Nj)) := E
[∫ T
0
fi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,p
t )dt+ gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )
]
.
Let us also introduce (Y i,pt , Z
i,p
t )t∈[0,T ] the solution to (4.9) associated with the forward component
(X i,pt )t∈[0,T ]:
dY
i,p
t = −∂xHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t ))dt
−E˜
[
∂µHi(t, X˜
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y˜
i,p
t , Z˜
i,p
t , αˆi(t, X˜
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y˜
i,p
t ))(X
i,p
t )
]
dt+ Zi,pt dW
i,p
t ,(7.1)
with Y i,pT = ∂xgi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T ) + E˜
[
∂µgi(X˜
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )(X
i,p
T )]. Note that, Y
i,p
t = ui(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t) a.s.
for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Proposition 7.1. Under Assumption (MFTC-FA-a), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, Ni ∈ N, there exists some
constant C independent of (Ni)
2
i=1 such that
J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni),βj,(Nj))− Ji ≥ λE
∫ T
0
|βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t |
2dt
−C
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,pt −X
i,p
t |
2
] 1
2 + E
[∫ T
0
|βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t |
2dt
] 1
2
)
εNi
+E
[∫ T
0
(
Hi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , β
i,p
t )−Hi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , β
i,p
t )
)
dt
+gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )− gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
,
where εNi := max(N
− 1
2
i , ǫNi), and 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni is arbitrary.
Proof. We can show the claim by following the same arguments used in the proof for Theorem 6.16
[11]. Since it is rather technical and lengthy, we give the details in Appendix A.
For investigating the approximate Nash equilibrium property, we now suppose that the agents in
the ith population use general strategy (βi,p)1≤p≤Ni under the restriction that (ξ
i,p,βi,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni
is exchangeable, and that the agents in the jth population 1 ≤ q ≤ Nj adopt the strategy
β
j,q
t := αˆj(t, U
j,q
t , µ
j
t , µ
i
t, uj(t, U
j,q
t , µ
j
t ))
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for any t ∈ [0, T ]. The cost functional for the ith population is now given by
J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj)) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,p
t )dt+ gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )
]
with the above specified control strategies. We now proceed as in the proof for Theorem 6.1.
The crucial problem is the term E
[
W2(ν
j
t , µ
j
t )
2
] 1
2 arising from the last line in the estimate of
Proposition 7.1. Although this term is suppressed in the non-cooperative game as in (6.9), it
does not happen in the current situation. The deviation from the strategy αˆi for the agents in
the ith population produces the term ||βi,1 − αˆ||H2 with no suppression of εNi in the estimate for
E
[
W2(ν
j
t , µ
j
t)
2
] 1
2 . This is why we need Assumption (MFTC-FA-b).
Theorem 7.1. Under Assumption (MFTC-FA-b) with sufficiently large (Ni)
2
i=1, the feedback
control functions
(
[0, T ] × Rd ∋ (t, x) 7→ αˆi(t, x, µ
i
t, µ
j
t , ui(t, x, µ
i
t))
)
1≤i,j≤2,j 6=i form an (
∑2
j=1 εNj )-
approximate Nash equilibrium i.e., there exists some constant C independent of (Ni)
2
i=1 such that
J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj)) ≥ J
Ni,Nj
i (αˆ
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))− C
2∑
j=1
εNj
for any Ai-valued F-progressively measurable processes (β
i,p ∈ H2)1≤p≤Ni so that (ξ
i,p,βi,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni
is exchangeable. Here,
(
εNj := max(N
− 1
2
j , ǫNj )
)
1≤j≤2.
Proof. Under (MFTC-FA-b), we can write the coefficients for both populations 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 as,
bj(t, x, µ, α) = bj,0(t) + bj,1(t)x+ b¯j,1(t)µ¯+ bj,2(t)α
σj(t, x, µ) = σj,0(t) + σj,1(t)x+ σ¯j,1(t)µ¯ . (7.2)
For the ith population, we get
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|U i,ps |
2
]
≤ CE
[
|ξi,p|2 +
∫ t
0
(
1 + |U i,ps |
2 +M2(ν
i
s)
2 + |βi,ps |
2
)
ds
]
,
which yields E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |U
i,p
t |
2
]
≤ C
(
1 + ||βi,p||2
H2
)
. We also get E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |U
j,q
t |
2
]
≤ C for the
jth population. Similarly, we see for the ith population,
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|U i,ps −X
i,p
s |
2
]
≤ CE
∫ t
0
[
|U i,ps −X
i,p
s |
2 +W2(ν
i
s, µ
i
s
)2 +W2(µ
i
s
, µis)
2 + |βi,ps − αˆ
i,p
s |
2
]
ds,
and then, by Gronwall’s inequality, we get
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U i,pt −X
i,p
t |
2
]
≤ C
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
+ ||βi,p − αˆi,p||2
H2
)
≤ C
(
ε2Ni + ||β
i,p − αˆi,p||2
H2
)
.
Similarly, we have
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U j,qt −X
j,q
t |
2
]
≤ C
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
j
t
, µ
j
t )
2
])
≤ Cε2Nj .
In particular, by the triangle inequality, supt∈[0,T ] E
[
W2(ν
j
t , µ
j
t)
2
]
≤ Cε2Nj holds.
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From (7.2), it is easy to see
|Hi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , β
i,p
t )−Hi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , β
i,p
t )|
= |fi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,p
t )− fi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, µ
j
t , β
i,p
t )|
≤ C(1 + |U i,pt |+ |M2(ν
i
t)|+ |M2(ν
j
t)|+ |β
i,p
t |)W2(ν
j
t , µ
j
t ) (7.3)
Using similar estimate for gi and exchangeability, we get from Proposition 7.1,
J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))− Ji
≥ λE
∫ T
0
|βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t |
2dt− C
(
1 + ||βi,p − αˆi,p||H2
)
εNi
−C
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,pt |
2 + |U j,qt |
2
] 1
2 + ||βi,p||H2
)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(ν
j
t , µ
j
t )
2
] 1
2
≥ λE
∫ T
0
|βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t |
2dt− C
(
1 + ||βi,p − αˆi,p||H2
)
εNi − C
(
1 + ||βi,p||H2
)
εNj .
Since ||αˆi,p||H2 ≤ C, and using the fact that
||βi,p − αˆi,p||H2εNi ≤ C
(
||βi,p − αˆi,p||2
H2
εNi + εNi
)
we get
J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni), αˆj,(Nj))− Ji ≥
(
λ− C
2∑
j=1
εNj
)
||βi,p − αˆi,p||2
H2
− C
2∑
j=1
εNj .
We now get the desired estimate from Lemma 7.2 for sufficiently large N1 and N2.
Remark 7.2. We have investigated the approximate Nash equilibrium in the closed loop framework.
The analysis for the open loop framework can be done in a quite similar manner as explained
in Remark 6.2. Generalization to an arbitrary number of populations 1 ≤ i ≤ m can be done
straightforwardly.
8 Approximate Equilibrium for MFTC-MFG with Finite Agents
In this section, we shall see how the solution to the Nash MFTC-MFG problem studied in Section 5
can provide an approximate Nash equilibrium among the two competing populations of finite agents,
where the agents in the first population are cooperative but those in the second population are not.
As we have seen in the last section, the effect of deviation from the optimal strategy in the first
population will not be suppressed by εN1 . In order to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium,
this feature implies that we have to cut the direct interaction with the first population in the state
dynamics of the second one. On the other hand, the agents in the second population are non-
cooperative. Hence, the effect of the deviation of the single agent in the second population will
be suppressed by εN2 . This suggests that we may include the direct interaction with the second
population in the state dynamics of the first one.
Throughout the section, we assume that the conditions used either in Theorem 5.2 or Theo-
rem 5.3 are satisfied. We let (µ1,µ2) ∈ C([0, T ];P2(R
d))2 denote a solution to the matching problem
(5.2). Moreover, unless otherwise stated, we use the same notation in the last two sections.
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8.1 Convergence of approximate optimal controls
For each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, we give i.i.d. copies of the state process in the mean field setup:
dX
i,p
t = bi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t )dW
i,p
t ,
for 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni, j 6= i, t ∈ [0, T ] with X
i,p
0 = ξ
i,p, and
αˆ1,p := αˆ1(t,X
1,p
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t , u1(t,X
1,p
t , µ
1
t )) ,
αˆ2,p := αˆ2(t,X
2,p
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , u2(t,X
2,p
t )) ,
where u1 is the master field defined in Lemma 4.2 applied to (5.3) and u2 the decoupling field
defined in Theorem 3.1 applied to (5.4) where the equilibrium flow of probability measures (µ1,µ2)
are used as inputs in both cases. As before, (ξi,p,W i,p)1≤p≤Ni,1≤i≤2 are assumed to be independent
with L(ξi,p) = µi0. By construction, (X
i,p)1≤p≤Ni are i.i.d. processes satisfying L(X
i,p
t ) = µ
i
t,
∀t ∈ [0, T ]. µi
t
:= 1Ni
∑Ni
p=1 δX
i,p
t denotes the empirical distribution of (X
i,p
t )1≤p≤Ni .
Lemma 8.1. Suppose that the conditions either for Theorem 5.2 or Theorem 5.3 are satisfied.
Then, for each population 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, there exists some sequence (ǫNi)Ni≥1 that tends to 0 as Ni
tends to ∞ and some constant C such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t
, µit)
2
]
≤ Cǫ2Ni .
Furthermore, when µi0 ∈ Pr(R
d) with r > 4, we have an explicit estimate
ǫ2Ni = N
−2/max(d,4)
i (1 + ln(Ni)1d=4) .
Proof. It is the direct result of Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 7.1.
We introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption 8.1. (MFTC-MFG-FA-a) On top of Assumption (MFTC-a) for the coefficients
(b1, σ1, f1, g1) and Assumption (MFG-a) for the coefficients (b2, σ2, f2, g2), either T or (λ
−1||bi,2||∞)1≤i≤2
is small enough to satisfy the conditions for Theorem 5.2 or Theorem 5.3. Moreover, the coefficients
(b1, σ1, f1, g1) satisfy (MFTC-FA-a) (A1-A2), and (b2, σ2, f2, g2) satisfy (MFG-FA) (A1-A2).
Assumption 8.2. (MFTC-MFG-FA-b) On top of Assumption (MFTC-MFG-FA-a), the co-
efficients b2,0 and σ2,0 are independent of the second measure argument, i.e. (b2,0, σ2,0)(t, µ, ν) =
(b2,0, σ2,0)(t, µ).
For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j 6= i, 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni, we introduce the state processes
dX
i,p
t = bi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t)dW
i,p
t ,
for t ∈ [0, T ] with Xi,p0 = ξ
i,p. Here, µit :=
1
Ni
∑Ni
p=1 δXi,pt
denotes the empirical distribution and
αˆ
1,p
t := αˆ1(t,X
1,p
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t , u1(t,X
1,p
t , µ
1
t )) ,
αˆ
2,p
t := αˆ2(t,X
2,p
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , u2(t,X
2,p
t )) .
Under Assumption (MFTC-MFG-FA-a), it is an (N1+N2)-dimensional Lipschitz SDE and hence
is well-defined. The corresponding cost functional for any agent p in the first population is given
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by
J
N1,N2
1 (αˆ
1,(N1), αˆ2,(N2)) := E
[∫ T
0
f1(t,X
1,p
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t , αˆ
1,p
t )dt+ g1(X
1,p
T , µ
1
T , µ
2
T )
]
,
and the for the agent q in the second population,
J
N2,N1,q
2 (αˆ
2,(N2), αˆ1,(N1)) := E
[∫ T
0
f2(t,X
2,q
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , αˆ
2,q
t )dt+ g2(X
2,q
T , µ
2
T , µ
1
T )
]
.
We also introduce the optimal cost functionals in the mean field setup:
J1 := E
[∫ T
0
f1(t,X
1,p
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t , αˆ
1,p
t )dt+ g1(X
1,p
T , µ
1
T , µ
2
T )
]
,
J
q
2 := E
[∫ T
0
f2(t,X
2,q
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , αˆ
2,q
t )dt+ g2(X
2,q
T , µ
2
T , µ
1
T )
]
.
Remark 8.1. Under the given control strategy, the value of Jq2 is independent of q. However, since
each agent in the second population can choose his/her own strategy in general, we need to specify
the agent when we discuss the approximate Nash equilibrium later. This is why we keep the index
q in the cost functional.
Lemma 8.2. Under Assumption (MFTC-MFG-FA-a), for any N1, N2 ∈ N and 1 ≤ q ≤ N2,
there exists some constant C independent of (Ni)
2
i=1 such that,
|JN1,N21 (αˆ
1,(N1), αˆ2,(N2))− J1| ≤ C
2∑
j=1
ǫNj , |J
N2,N1,q
2 (αˆ
2,(N2), αˆ1,(N1))− Jq2 | ≤ C
2∑
j=1
ǫNj
where ǫNj is the one given in Lemma 8.1.
Proof. As in the last two sections, we can show, by the same arguments,
2∑
i=1
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,pt −X
i,p
t |
2
]
≤ C
2∑
i=1
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
i
t, µ
i
t)
2
]
≤ C
2∑
i=1
ǫ2Ni ,
and E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,p
t |
2
]
+ E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |X
i,p
t |
2
]
≤ C. Thus the convergence of the cost functionals
is the direct result of Lemma 6.2 and Lemma 7.2.
8.2 Approximate Nash Equilibrium
We now consider the general state dynamics for the agents 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, j 6= i, 1 ≤ p ≤ Ni,
dU
i,p
t = bi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,p
t )dt+ σi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t )dW
i,p
t
with t ∈ [0, T ], U i,p0 = ξ
i,p and βi,p ∈ H2 is an Ai-valued F-progressively measurable process. For
the first population, we impose the condition so that (ξ1,p,β1,p,W 1,p)1≤p≤N1 is exchangeable. As
usual, νit :=
1
Ni
∑Ni
p=1 δU i,pt
denotes the empirical distribution. We shall investigate the following
two situations:
(setup-1): The agents in the first population adopt the general exchangeable strategy (β1,p)1≤p≤N1
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and the agents in the second population adopt, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
β
2,q
t := αˆ2(t, U
2,q
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , u2(t, U
2,q
t )) , 1 ≤ q ≤ N2.
(setup-2): The first agent in the second population adopts the general strategy β2,1, and the
remaining agents in the second population as well as the agents in the first population adopt, for
any t ∈ [0, T ],
β
1,p
t := αˆ1(t, U
1,p
t , µ
1
t , µ
2
t , u1(t, U
1,p
t , µ
1
t )) , 1 ≤ p ≤ N1,
β
2,q
t := αˆ2(t, U
2,q
t , µ
2
t , µ
1
t , u2(t, U
2,q
t )) , 2 ≤ q ≤ N2 .
The cost functional for any agent in the first population in (setup-1) is given by
J
N1,N2
1 (β
1,(N1), αˆ2,(N2)) := E
[∫ T
0
f1(t, U
1,p
t , ν
1
t , ν
2
t , β
1,p
t )dt+ g1(U
1,p
T , ν
1
T , ν
2
T )
]
with an arbitrary 1 ≤ p ≤ N1. On the other hand, the cost functional for the first agent in the
second population in (setup-2) is given by
J
N2,N1,1
2 (β
2,1, αˆ2,(N2)
−1
, αˆ1,(N1)) := E
[∫ T
0
f2(t, U
2,1
t , ν
2
t , ν
1
t , β
2,1
t )dt+ g2(U
2,1
t , ν
2
T , ν
1
T )
]
.
The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 8.1. Under Assumption (MFTC-MFG-FA-b) with sufficiently large (Ni)
2
i=1, the feed-
back control functions
(
[0, T ]×Rd ∋ (t, x) 7→ αˆ1(t, x, µ
1
t , µ
2
t , u1(t, x, µ
1
t ))
)
for the first population and(
[0, T ]×Rd ∋ (t, x) 7→ αˆ2(t, x, µ
2
t , µ
1
t , u2(t, x))
)
for the second one form an (
∑2
j=1 εNj )-approximate
Nash equilibrium i.e., there exists some constant C independent of (Ni)
2
i=1 such that
J
N1,N2
1 (β
1,(N1), αˆ2,(N2)) ≥ JN1,N21 (αˆ
1,(N1), αˆ2,(N2))− C
2∑
j=1
εNj
under (setup-1), and also that
J
N2,N1,1
2 (β
2,1, αˆ2,(N2)
−1
, αˆ1,(N1)) ≥ JN2,N1,12 (αˆ
2,(N2), αˆ1,(N1))− C
2∑
j=1
εNj
under (setup-2). In both cases,
(
εNj := max(N
− 1
2
j , ǫNj )
)
1≤j≤2.
Proof. (first step): Let us first prove the claim under (setup-1). In contrast to the assumptions
used in Theorem 7.1, the agents in the first population now have direct interactions with those in
the second population in their state processes. Applying the result of Proposition 7.1 to the first
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population, we get
J
N1,N2
1 (β
1,(N1), αˆ2,(N2))− J1 ≥ λE
∫ T
0
|β1,pt − αˆ
1,p
t |
2dt
−C
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U1,pt −X
1,p
t |
2
] 1
2 + E
[∫ T
0
|β1,pt − αˆ
1,p
t |
2dt
] 1
2
)
εN1
+E
[∫ T
0
(
H1(t, U
1,p
t , ν
1
t , ν
2
t , Y
1,p
t , Z
1,p
t , β
1,p
t )−H1(t, U
1,p
t , ν
1
t , µ
2
t , Y
1,p
t , Z
1,p
t , β
1,p
t )
)
dt
+g1(U
1,p
T , ν
1
T , ν
2
T )− g1(U
1,p
T , ν
1
T , µ
2
T )
]
,
where (Y 1,p, Z1,p) is defined in the same way as (7.1). Since (b2, σ2) are independent from the
second measure argument, it is straightforward to confirm that E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |U
2,q
t |
2
]
≤ C for any q.
Then we get E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |U
1,p
t |
2
]
≤ C
(
1+ ||β1,p||2
H2
)
for any p. Moreover, it is immediate to obtain,
for any q,
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U2,qt −X
2,q
t |
2
]
≤ C sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(µ
2
t
, µ2t )
2
]
≤ Cε2N2 .
In particular, this also implies supt∈[0,T ] E
[
W2(ν
2
t , µ
2
t )
2
]
≤ Cε2N2 . Since, for any p,
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|U1,ps −X
1,p
s |
2
]
≤ CE
∫ t
0
[
|U1,ps −X
1,p
s |
2 +
2∑
j=1
W2(ν
j
s, µ
j
s)
2 + |β1,ps − αˆ
1,p
s |
2
]
ds
we get, from the last estimate and the triangle inequality,
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U1,pt −X
1,p
t |
2
]
≤ C
( 2∑
j=1
ε2Nj + ||β
1,p − αˆ1,p||2
H2
)
.
By the standard calculation, we see
∣∣∣E[∫ T
0
(
H1(t, U
1,p
t , ν
1
t , ν
2
t , Y
1,p
t , Z
1,p
t , β
1,p
t )−H1(t, U
1,p
t , ν
1
t , µ
2
t , Y
1,p
t , Z
1,p
t , β
1,p
t )
)
dt
+g1(U
1,p
T , ν
1
T , ν
2
T )− g1(U
1,p
T , ν
1
T , µ
2
T )
]∣∣∣
≤ C
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[ 2∑
i=1
|U i,pt |
2 + |Y 1,pt |
2
] 1
2
+ E
[∫ T
0
[
|Z1,pt |
2 + |β1,pt |
2
]
dt
] 1
2
)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2(ν
2
t , µ
2
t )
2
] 1
2
≤ C
(
1 + ||β1,p||H2
)
εN2 .
Since ||αˆ1,p||H2 ≤ C, we get
J
N1,N2
1 (β
1,(N1), αˆ2,(N2))− J1
≥ λ||β1,p − αˆ1,p||2
H2
− C
(
1 + ||β1,pt − αˆ
1,p||H2
) 2∑
j=1
εNj
≥
(
λ− C
2∑
j=1
εNj
)
||β1,p − αˆ1,p||2
H2
− C
2∑
j=1
εNj .
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Now Lemma 8.2 gives the desired estimate.
(second step): Let us now prove the claim under (setup-2). By putting i = 2 and j = 1,
all of the arguments in the proof for Theorem 6.1 work as they are. In fact, due to the indepen-
dence of (b2, σ2) from the second measure argument, some of the estimates become slightly simpler.
In particular, (6.8) and (6.9) hold with (i = 2, j = 1). The estimate (6.10) is now given by
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|U2,1T − U
2,1
t |
2
] 1
2 ≤ C(1 + ||β2,1||H2)εN2
without the term εN1 . The estimate for |J
N2,N1,1
2 (β
2,1, αˆ2,(N2)
−1
, αˆ1,(N1)) − J
1
2(β
2,1)| is given by
exactly the same formula as in (third step) of the proof for Theorem 6.1 with (i = 2, j = 1). Now,
combining the result in Lemma 8.2, we get the desired estimate.
Remark 8.2. We have investigated the approximate Nash equilibrium in the closed loop framework.
The analysis for the open loop framework can be done in a quite similar manner as explained
in Remark 6.2. Generalization to an arbitrary number of populations 1 ≤ i ≤ m can be done
straightforwardly, but the direct interactions in the state processes must be carefully arranged. The
empirical distribution of the states of the agents who are in a cooperative population must not
appear in the coefficients of the state process of the agents in any other populations. The empirical
distribution can appear only in the control strategies indirectly induced by the interactions in the
cost functions. On the other hand, the distribution of the states of the agents who are in a non-
cooperative population can directly appear in the coefficients of the state processes of the agents in
any populations.
9 Conclusion and Discussion
In this work, we have systematically investigated mean field games and mean field type control
problems with multiple populations for three different situations: (i) every agent is non-cooperative,
(ii) the agents within each population are cooperative, and (iii) the agents in some populations are
cooperative but not in the other populations. The relevant adjoint equations were shown to be
given in terms of a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-
Vlasov type. In each case, we have provided several sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium, in particular the one which allows the cost functions of quadratic growth both in
the state variable as well as its distribution so that it is applicable to some of the popular setups
of linear quadratic problems. In the second half of the paper, under additional assumptions, we
have proved that each solution to the mean field problems solved in the first half of the paper
actually provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game with a large but
finite number of agents.
As future works, we may study similar problems by adopting HJB type approach using so-called
quadratic growth BSDEs as in [10], where the backward component directly represents the value
function. Although we need the boundedness of the coefficients and the non-degeneracy for the
diffusion function, the resultant boundedness of the solution to the BSDEs will make the analysis
simpler. When each agent is subject to independent random Poisson measure, we may use the
recent developments of the quadratic growth BSDEs with jumps such as in [29, 23, 18]. Finally,
developing an efficient numerical method for mean field games and mean field type control problems
remains as a very important issue. For a general problem, due to its infinite dimensionality, machine
learning techniques (such as in [16]) are promising candidates. If the problem can be approximated
by a linear quadratic setup, its solution may help to accelerate the speed of convergence for the
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learning process in the spirit of the work [19].
A Proof for Proposition 7.1
In the following, we use the Landau notation O(·) in the sense that |O(x)| ≤ C|x| with some constant C
independent of the population sizes (N1, N2). Let us define
T
i,p
1 := E
[
〈U i,pT −X
i,p
T , Y
i,p
T 〉
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
[
fi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , β
i,p
t )− fi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , αˆ
i,p
t )
]
dt
]
,
T
i,p
2,1 := E
[
gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )− gi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
,
T
i,p
2,2 := E
[
〈U i,pT −X
i,p
T , ∂xgi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )〉
]
,
T
i,p
2,3 := EE˜
[
〈U˜ i,pT − X˜
i,p
T , ∂µgi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )(X˜
i,p
T )
]
,
which satisfy J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni),βj,(Nj))− Ji = T
i,p
1 + T
i,p
2 with T
i,p
2 := T
i,p
2,1 − T
i,p
2,2 − T
i,p
2,3.
A.1 Estimate for T
i,p
2
Consider the difference
∣∣∣EE˜[〈U˜ i,pT − X˜ i,pT , ∂µgi(X i,pT , µiT , µjT )(X˜i,pT )]− 1Ni
Ni∑
q=1
E˜
[
〈U˜ i,pT − X˜
i,p
T , ∂µgi(X˜
i,q
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )(X˜
i,p
T )
]∣∣∣
≤ E
[
|U i,pT −X
i,p
T |
2
] 1
2 E˜
[∣∣∣E[∂µgi(Xi,pT , µiT , µjT )(X˜ i,pT )]− 1Ni
Ni∑
q=1
∂µgi(X˜
i,q
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )(X˜
i,p
T )
∣∣∣2] 12
≤ CE
[
|U i,pT −X
i,p
T |
2
] 1
2N
− 1
2
i . (A.1)
The last estimate is from the law of large numbers with the finite second moment of ∂µgi-term and the
independence of (X˜
i,q
T )1≤q≤Ni . Taking the average in p, we get,
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
T
i,p
2,3 = E
[
|U i,1T −X
i,1
T |
2
] 1
2O(N
− 1
2
i ) +
1
N2i
Ni∑
p,q=1
E
[
〈U i,pT −X
i,p
T , ∂µgi(X
i,q
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )(X
i,p
T )
]
= E
[
|U i,1T −X
i,1
T |
2
] 1
2O(N
− 1
2
i ) +
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
EE˜
[
〈U i,θT −X
i,θ
T , ∂µgi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T , µ
j
T )(X
i,θ
T )
]
,
where θ is a random variable on (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) with uniform distribution on the set {1, · · · , Ni}. Using Lemma 7.1
and the Lipschitz property of ∂µgi with respect to the first measure argument, we get
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
T
i,p
2,3 = E
[
|U i,1T −X
i,1
T |
2
] 1
2O(εNi) +
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
EE˜
[
〈U i,θT −X
i,θ
T , ∂µgi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T
, µ
j
T )(X
i,θ
T )
]
. (A.2)
Using Lemma 7.1 also for T i,p2,2 , T
i,p
2,3, we obtain
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
T
i,p
2 =
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
{
E
[
gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , µ
j
T )− gi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T
, µ
j
T )
]
−E
[
〈U i,pT −X
i,p
T , ∂xgi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T
, µ
j
T )〉
]
− EE˜
[
〈U i,θT −X
i,θ
T , ∂µgi(X
i,p
T , µ
i
T
, µ
j
T )(X
i,θ
T )〉
]}
+
(
1 + E
[
|U i,1T −X
i,1
T |
2
] 1
2
)
O(εNi) +
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
E
[
gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )− gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
.
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Using the fact that the conditional law of U i,θT (respectively X
i,θ
T ) under P˜ is given by the empirical distri-
bution νiT (respectively µ
i
T
), the convexity in (MFTC-a) (A6) implies
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
T
i,p
2 ≥
(
1 + E
[
|U i,1T −X
i,1
T |
2
] 1
2
)
O(εNi) +
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
E
[
gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )− gi(U
i,p
T , ν
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
.
A.2 Estimate for T
i,p
1
Using Ito formula to evaluate E
[
〈U i,pT −X
i,p
T , Y
i,p
T 〉
]
, we can rewrite T i,p1 as
T
i,p
1 = E
∫ T
0
{
Hi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , β
i,p
t )−Hi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )
−〈U i,pt −X
i,p
t , ∂xHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )〉
−E˜
[
〈U˜ i,pt − X˜
i,p
t , ∂µHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )(X˜
i,p
t )〉
]}
dt
=: T i,p1,1 − T
i,p
1,2 − T
i,p
1,3 .
Using local Lipschitz continuity of Hi with respect to the first measure argument, the estimate
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi,pt |
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y i,pt |
2 +
∫ T
0
(|Zi,pt |
2 + |αˆi,pt |
2)dt
]
≤ C ,
and the result in Lemma 7.1, we get
T
i,p
1,1 = E
∫ T
0
{
Hi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , β
i,p
t )−Hi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )
}
dt+O(εNi) .
We also get by similar calculation that
T
i,p
1,2 = E
∫ T
0
[
〈U i,pt −X
i,p
t , ∂xHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )〉
]
dt
+ sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,pt −X
i,p
t |
2
] 1
2O(εNi) .
By the same arguments used in (A.1), we get
T
i,p
1,3 =
1
Ni
Ni∑
q=1
∫ T
0
E
[
〈U i,pt −X
i,p
t , ∂µHi(t,X
i,q
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,q
t , Z
i,q
t , αˆ
i,q
t )(X
i,p
t )〉
]
dt
+ sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,1t −X
i,1
t |
2
] 1
2O(N
− 1
2
i ) ,
and then same analysis used for (A.2) gives
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
T
i,p
1,3 =
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
∫ T
0
EE˜
[
〈U i,θt −X
i,θ
t , ∂µHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )(X
i,θ
t )〉
]
dt
+ sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,1t −X
i,1
t |
2
] 1
2O(εNi) .
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Finally, we can see that
∣∣∣E∫ T
0
[
〈βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t , ∂αHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )− ∂αHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )〉
]
dt
∣∣∣
≤ CE
[∫ T
0
|βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t |
2dt
] 1
2
εNi .
Using the optimality condition, exchangeability, and the results obtained above, we get
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
T
i,p
1 ≥
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
(T i,p1,1 − T
i,p
1,2 − T
i,p
1,3)−
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
E
∫ T
0
[
〈βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t , ∂αHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )〉
]
dt
=
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
E
∫ T
0
{
Hi(t, U
i,p
t , ν
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , β
i,p
t )−Hi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )
−〈U i,pt −X
i,p
t , ∂xHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )〉 − E˜
[
〈U i,θt −X
i,θ
t , ∂µHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )(X
i,θ
t )〉
]
−〈βi,pt − αˆ
i,p
t , ∂αHi(t,X
i,p
t , µ
i
t
, µ
j
t , Y
i,p
t , Z
i,p
t , αˆ
i,p
t )〉
}
dt
+
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,1t −X
i,1
t |
2
] 1
2 + E
[∫ T
0
|βi,1t − αˆ
i,1
t |
2dt
] 1
2
)
O(εNi)
+E
∫ T
0
[
Hi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , Y
i,1
t , Z
i,1
t , β
i,1
t )−Hi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,1
t , Z
i,1
t , β
i,1
t )
]
dt
≥ λE
∫ T
0
|βi,1t − αˆ
i,1
t |
2dt
+
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,1t −X
i,1
t |
2
] 1
2 + E
[∫ T
0
|βi,1t − αˆ
i,1
t |
2dt
] 1
2
)
O(εNi)
+E
∫ T
0
[
Hi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , Y
i,1
t , Z
i,1
t , β
i,1
t )−Hi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,1
t , Z
i,1
t , β
i,1
t )
]
dt .
A.3 Final Step
By exchangeability, we have
J
Ni,Nj
i (β
i,(Ni),βj,(Nj))− Ji = T
i,p
1 + T
i,p
2 =
1
Ni
Ni∑
p=1
(T i,p1 + T
i,p
2 )
≥ λE
∫ T
0
|βi,1t − αˆ
i,1
t |
2dt+
(
1 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|U i,1t −X
i,1
t |
2
] 1
2 + E
[∫ T
0
|βi,1t − αˆ
i,1
t |
2dt
] 1
2
)
O(εNi)
+E
∫ T
0
[
Hi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, ν
j
t , Y
i,1
t , Z
i,1
t , β
i,1
t )−Hi(t, U
i,1
t , ν
i
t, µ
j
t , Y
i,1
t , Z
i,1
t , β
i,1
t )
]
dt
+E
[
gi(U
i,1
T , ν
i
T , ν
j
T )− gi(U
i,1
T , ν
i
T , µ
j
T )
]
.
This gives the desired result.
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